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Stephen C Thaman * CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE 
BAlANCE: MODERN EXCLUSIONARY RULES 
AND THE TOLERATION OF POLICE 
LAWLESSNESS IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
This article explores the tension in modern criminal procedure between the goal of 
ascertaining the material truth of the criminal charge and the respect for important 
human rights of criminal suspects during the investigation of their alleged criminal 
responsibility. It examines two major areas where police run the risk of violating and 
often do violate the constitutional right~ of criminal suspects during interrogations 
and during invasions of privacy in the form of dwelling searches and interception 
of confidential communications. The approaches of modern democracies to this 
dilemma run from the strict exclusion of all direct and indirect evidence (fruits of 
the poisonous tree), whenever a substantial constitutional right is violated, to a dis-
cretionary approach, which balances various factors, including the need to ascertain 
the truth before deciding whether to use the evidence. The ambition of the article is to 
draw clear lines between when courts should exclude evidence and when discretion 
can reign. 
Keywords: exclusionary rule/fruits of the poisonous tree/nullities/privacy/ 
search for truth/ self-incrimination (privilege of) 
1 Introduction 
The notions of 'truth' and 'evidence' have been inextricably intertwined 
in the history of Western criminal procedure since the advent of inquisi-
torial criminal procedure on the European Continent in the late Middle 
Ages. The justice achieved by early customary and lay courts in pre-inqui-
sitorial times often had little to do with either truth or evidence. The only 
criminal evidence accepted as being 'true' was the hard facts produced by 
the flagrant crime, when 'hand-having' thieves or 'red-handed' assailants 
were caught in the act and either summarily killed or hurriedly sentenced 
to death by ad hoc courts. Mediation conducted by respected community 
figures or elders and restoring the peace between victim (or victim's 
family or clan) and culprit took priority over the meticulous determi-
nation of 'what happened' in the era of duels, swearing contests among 
compurgators, and divine ordeals. There was little truth in these pro-
cedures but also little punishment because punishment triggered 
anger, feud, and blood revenge. Co~ppensation to the victim was the 
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rule, if the suspect was not finished off fragrantly. Even when juries or 
SchOJ!engerichte replaced these primitive procedures, their roles had 
more to do with appraising whether the accused should be accepted 
back into the community and on what terms than with evidence analysis 
and truth determination.' 
It was with the 'scientization' of criminal procedure and the displace-
ment of lay judges and irrational procedures by professional judges with 
their 'truth-seeking' inquisitorial powers of evidence gathering and pres-
ervation that the link between 'evidence' and 'truth' was soldered and 
took priority over the more humane concern of smoothing over the con-
flict the wrongful act had caused in the community. The growing ascen-
dency of inquisitorial procedure was dictated by the needs of the central 
powers of church and state which sought to subjugate local governments 
and their systems of dispute-resolution. The 'truths' the governments 
sought to prove through their courts were often self-perpetuating myths 
or fictions upon which the central powers' domination rested; the 
crimes which arguably gave rise to this system were crimes against tl1e 
state or religion that could not be proved adequately by mere witnesses 
or victims (there were none): they had to be proved by judges learned 
in the science of the law, acting secretly without being nettled by 
victims, accuseds, lawyers, or the public.3 
But the dominance of inquisitorial procedure on the European conti-
nent did not, despite advances in evidence taking and greater predictabil-
ity of professional decision making, mean a humanizing of the resolution 
of criminal disputes. Enlightenment thinkers complained that more 
terror and inhumanity were perpetrated by the administration of the 
law in these times than were committed by common criminals.' More 
innocent persons were convicted and sentenced to death in this era 
l See in general Stephen C Thaman, 'A Typology of Consensual Criminal Procedures: An 
Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Theory and Practice of Avoiding the Full 
Criminal Trial' in Stephen C Thaman, ed, World Plea Bargaining (Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2010) 297 [Thaman, 'Typology']. 
2 The 'right solution' was based on 'textual analysis and logical penetration of its 
meaning.' Law 'came increasingly to be regarded as a self-contained, or closed 
system - a 'science'; Mirjan R Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Autharity (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) at 31. This science 'needed no illumination' 
because it was a science of text; Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995) at 48. 
3 On how the secret, victimless crime of heresy required a new procedure, see Richard 
Vogler, A Wm-ld View uf Criminal Justice (Burlington, VT: Ashg-ate, 2005) at 25. The 
procedure in ecclesiastical courts for heresy and magic was the most 'ferocious' and 
required the forced cooperation_ of the accused; see Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione: 
tearia del garantismo penale, 5th ed (Rome: Laterza.1998) at 577 [Ferrajoli]. 
4 Ferrajoli, ibid at 339, 382. On criminal procedure of this epoch as a 'science of 
horrors,' see ibid at 578. 
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than in any other era of European history, often based on confessions 
extorted through legalized torture or the threat thereof." 
Although torture was officially abolished in Europe by the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries,6 continental 
Europe experienced political convulsions throwing most countries back 
and forth between the extremes of absolute-monarchist police state and 
liberalism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. All pre-
tences of a state under the rule of law, of course, were erased with the 
rise of Bolshevism in Russia, Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, and 
Francoism in Spain. 
It was in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust and Soviet totalitar-
ianism that the human rights movement was launched after 1945, result-
ing in the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) / the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ,8 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) .9 The 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) followed in 1969.10 
Mter emerging from Fascist domination after World War II, Germany 
and Italy enacted new constitutions which reflected the priority given 
to the protection of citizens against the threat of violence and arbitrari-
ness by the state. Spain followed in 1978. A similar explosion of new con-
stitutions and criminal-procedure reforms occurred in the 1990s as Latin 
America emerged from decades of authoritarian military regimes and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia gave rise to a host of new 
aspiring democracies in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. It is still 
too early to predict whether the domino effect of the so-called 'Arab 
Spring,' which as of this writing has resulted in the toppling of repressive 
5 On the conviction of the innocent, Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e Dell£ Pene, 4th ed 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995) at 62. Jean de Ia Bruyere, 'De quelques usage' in Les 
Caracteres, says, 'Torture is a wonderful invention and may be counted upon to ruin 
an innocent person with a weak constitution and exonerate a guilty person born 
robust'; and further, 'I might almost say in regard to myself, 'I will not be a thief or 
a murderer'; but to say, 'I shall not someday be punished as such,' would be to 
speak very boldly'; cited in Adhemar Esmein, History of Continental Criminal Procedure, 
with Special Reference to France, translated by .John Simpson (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1913) at 352, 380. 
6 John H Langbein, Torture and the Lnw of Proof Europe and England in the Ancien Rigime 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) at 10. 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 
13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) at 71 [UDHR). 
8 ('.lmvention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 
213 UNTS 221, Eur TS 5 [ECHR). 
9 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
6 ILM 368 (1967) [ICCP). 
10 American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 143, 9 ILM 99 
(1969) [ACHR). 
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dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt, will extend further and actually lead to 
a similar democratization and respect for the rule of law. 
The experience in common-law countries has been a bit different. 
England had no experience of Fascism and, due to its unique tradition, 
no written constitution or Bill of Rights listing specific protections for 
its citizens. Police lawlessness, where it existed, did not, generally, affect 
the admission of evidence in the common-law tradition. In Britain, the 
courts did not worry about the methods used to acquire evidence if it 
was otherwise relevant and material. 11 
The United States, on the other hand, had its Bill of Rights of 1791, 
the purpose of which was to restrict the new federal government from 
passing any laws which would affect the freedoms of the citizens of the 
thirteen states which made up the new Union at that time. In the early 
days, however, nearly all criminal cases in the United States were 
handled in the state courts, goven1ed by state laws and constitutions. 
Until the end of the Civil War in 1865, African-American slaves had few 
rights under the laws of the states or the federal government. The enact-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1865 
granted the freed slaves 'due process of law' in relation to the states, 
yet it was only in the 1930s that the US Supreme Court (USSC) began 
overturning state criminal convictions based on torture and rejecting 
the use of other coercive tactics which undermine the freedom of will 
of the accused as 'violations of due process.' 12 
Already in 1914 the USSC adopted an exclusionary rule which pre-
vented the use of evidence seized by Federal officials in violation of the 
Fourth Arnendment. 13 The problems this rule addressed were made abun-
dantly clear: 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain 
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter 
often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices 
destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction 
in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of 
11 Peter Murphy & Eric Stockdale, cds, Blackstone's Criminal Practice, 13th ed (London, 
Blackstone Press, 2003) at 1974. 
12 The most notorious of the dozens of cases decided in this area was Bwwn v Mississippi, 
297 US 278 ( 1936) , which involved the torture of Black suspects in a murder case and 
their hurried sentence to death three days later in a kangaroo jury court. 
13 The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution reads, 'The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unrea~onahle searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no Warr.mts shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized.' 
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the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for 
the maintenance of such fundamental rights.' 4 
The USSC only became a true constitutional court for the entire 
country, however, when, influenced by the civil rights movement in the 
1950s and 1960s, it decided that the Fourth, Fifth15 and Sixth 
Arnendments'6 to the US Constitution, were binding on the states, thus 
enabling it to affect racist practices in many, mainly Southern, states 
which deprived Mrican-American citizens of the protection of the law 
in criminal cases. 
The notion that evidence obtained as a result of police violation of the 
constitution could not be used in a criminal .trial was finally established 
nationwide and made applicable to the states during the years that Earl 
Warren was Chief Justice. '7 The landmark decisions in this respect were 
(1) Mapp v Ohio," which made the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule of R-eeks binding on the States; (2) Wong Sun v United States/9 
which re-articulated the exclusionary rule in relation to derivative evi-
dence causally linked to preceding constitutional violations;20 (3) 
Massiah v United States/' which provided for exclusion of statements 
made to government agents by charged defendants, in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and, of course ( 4) Miranda v 
Arizona,22 which provided for exclusion of confessions and admissions 
made during custodial interrogation where the suspect was not advised 
of the right to silence and the right to counsel or did not effectively 
waive those rights, in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These landmark decisions, especially Mapp and Miranda, have been 
very influential overseas, but so have some of the limitations placed on 
the exclusionary rule by the USSC under Chief Justice Warren Burger,23 
foremost of these being the exceptions to the doctrine of the 'fruits of 
14 l#eks v United States, 232 US 383 at 392 (1911) [Weeks]. 
15 US Const amend V provides inter alia that '[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.' 
16 US Const amend VI, inter alia: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.' 
17 From 1953 to 1969. 
18 Mapp v Ohio, 367 US fi43 (1961) [Mapp]. 
19 Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 (1963). 
20 The term 'fruit of the poisonous tree' was originally coined by Justice Frankfurter in 
Nardone v United States, 308 US 338 (1939), but the idea that the government could 
not use derivative evidence was articulated nineteen years earlier by Justice Holmes 
in Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States, 251 US 385 (1920) [Silverthorne]. 
21 Massiah v United States, 377 US 201 (1964). 
22 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) [Miranda]. 
23 Warren Burger was Chief Justice of the USSC from 1969 to 1986. 
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the poisonous tree' known as 'inevitable discovery' 24 and 'independent 
source'25 and the 'good faith' exception to violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.26 
Long before the innovations of the Warren Court, inquisitorial systems on 
the European continent had developed rules to address violations of the law 
by organs oflaw enforcement at a time when common-law courts never ques-
tioned the provenance of the evidence before them. Continental European 
codes of criminal procedure prescribed rather strict rules for the gathering 
of evidence and the performance of other acts during the preliminary crim-
inal investigation and provided for the nullification of the efficacy of these 
acts if they were performed in violation of the statutory rules. So-called 'nul-
lities' could and did lead to exclusion of evidence.27 In fact, one ofthe most 
influential treatises on exclusionary rules was written in Germany before the 
USSC's decision in ft.eekf8 and is one of the first scholarly attempts to create a 
balancing test for the introduction of illegally gathered evidence. 
The thesis of this article is that, while all lawmakers and courts 'balance'-
that is, make value judgment<; - when navigating between the Scylla of fun-
damental or constitutional rights and the Charybdis of truth and accuracy in 
criminal trials, some kinds of official law violations are so serious that they 
should trigger a very strong presumption of non-use of the evidence result-
ing therefrom. True 'balancing' of various considerations should occur only 
where the violation is not properly characterized as fundamental. 
The value judgment that a violation is fundamental is sometimes made at 
the level of international law, such as with the prohibition of torture, some-
times in constitutions and codes, and sometimes by the courts. The prevailing 
view is that the violations must be 'serious'; that is, must be of fundamental or 
constitutional rights. Even if a constitutional violation has been identified 
which could trigger exclusion or 'non-use' of evidence, judges must again 
decide whether the evidence the prosecution seeks to use is actually the 
'fruit of the poisonous tree'; that is, does it derive inexorably from the consti-
tutional violation? And finally, even if it is agreed that a constitutional right has 
been violated and the evidence sought to be admitted is the fruit thereof, 
some jurisdictions still require the judge to engage in a balancing of other 
important interests before deciding on admissibility, for instance: ( 1) the 
24 First articulated in Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 at 444-50 (1984) [Williams]. 
25 First articulated in Silverthorne, supra note 20 at 392 but then reaffirmed in Murray v 
United States, 487 US 533 at 537-9 (1988) [Murray]. 
26 United States v Leon, 468 US 897 at 918-25 (1984) [Leon]. 
27 On how inquisitorial Europe developed 'extrinsic' exclusionary rules relating to 'values 
unrelated to the pursuit of truth' at a time when the common law only knew 'intrinsic' 
rules relating to the probative value of evidence, see Miljan R Damaska, Evidence La:w 
Adrift (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) at 12-7. 
28 Emst Beling, Die Beweisvemote als Grenz.en der Wahrheitserfurschung im Strafprozess (Breslau, 
Germany: Schletter'sche Buchhandlung, 1903) [Beling]. 
.. 
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seriousness of the constitutional violation (was it intentional, reckless, negli-
gent, etc), (2) the gravity of the crime which is before the court, (3) the char-
acter of the evidence subject to exclusion (its credibility, importance for 
proving guilt, whether it constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime or is 
'mere evidence,' etc), (4) whether use of the evidence would violate the 
defendant's right to a fair trial, and other factors. 
While courts will inevitably engage in balancing, I do not think that 
determining the material truth in a criminal proceeding should be con-
sidered to be a higher goal than respect for the international and consti-
tutional protection of the right to human dignity and related guarantees 
respecting the right to silence and privacy. But the principle of material 
truth, which I believe nowhere has constitutional status, still holds sway in 
the criminal courts. Yet, a legal system which takes advantage of explicit 
loopholes or vague balancing principles in order to use evidence gath-
ered directly or indirectly by means of unconstitutional acts of its investi-
gative organs only with difficulty incorporates the spirit of a state under 
the rule of law. As long as such loopholes exist, constitutional rights 
will be routinely violated by state officials. 
A dismissal or acquittal in a criminal proceeding violates no funda-
mental human rights, even when the evidence seems to point to the 
guilt of the accused. The victim of an act of violence or theft remains a 
victim, whether or not the defendant is convicted. In the case of victim-
less drug crimes, which constitute the overwhelming majority of cases 
involving illegal searches and a large number of those with illegal wire-
taps, a dismissal does not prevent future surveillance and legal apprehen-
sion of what are usually repeat offenders involved in an illegal enterprise. 
In the United States, the power in the hands of law enforcement is 
awesome. Life impri~onment is possible for first-time drug dealers'" and 
recidivist thieves.30 Around 751 of every 100,000 residents of the United 
States are behind bars." The coercive nature of the plea-bargaining 
system means that no more than 5 per cent of those convicted actually 
have a trial that results in an ascertainment of 'the truth' based on the 
full panoply of 'due process' rights. 32 A healthy scepticism if not mistrust 
of the powers of the state, even in a modern democracy, may still be war-
ranted and the warnings of the authors of the Weeks and subsequent 
decisions should not be dismissed as being antiquated.33 
29 Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957 (1991). 
30 Ewing v California, 538 US 11 (2003); !1Jrkye:r v Andrade, 538 US 63 (2003). 
31 Adam Liptak, 'Inmate Count in US Dwarfs Other :"Jations' New Yom Times (23 April 
2008) AI. 
32 Thaman, 'Typology,' supra note 1 at 327-8. 
33 I disagree with the majority of the USSC when they intimate that improved police 
training, discipline regimes, and the possibility of civil suits (which were not available 
when Mapp, supra note 18 was decided) might make the exclusionary rule no 
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In order to provide an effective remedy for violations of rights in crim-
inal investigations, evidence obtained in violation of fundamental consti-
tutional rights should presumptively be excluded, su~ject only to 
narrowly drawn exceptions for good-faith errors and emergencies. 
Exclusion of such evidence ~hould not depend on the balancing of inter-
ests; otherwise, fundamental human rights will be lost in the balance. But 
evidence obtained through unlawful state conduct that does not rise to 
the level of violating a fundamental constitutional right may properly 
be considered for admission on the basis of a balancing test. To illustrate 
this distinction, I will concentrate on violations of two of the most impor-
tant constitutional protections; that is, (1) where police violate the consti-
tution in acquiring confessions, and (2) where they violate the 
constitution by invading the privacy of one's home or private conversa-
tions."• I will analyse the constitutional, statutory, and court-made doc-
trine dealing with seemingly absolute exclusionary rules in comparative 
and international law, which brook of no balancing (or are 'pre-balanced' 
by the law-giver), and relative exclusionary rules, which encourage balan-
cing of various interests, and will explore how these absolute and relative 
exclusionary rules deal with the use of derivative evidence or 'fruits of the 
poisonous tree.' Before beginning my analysis of the various approaches, 
however, I will briefly discuss the concept of 'nullities' as it developed in 
civil-law jurisdictions and try to flush out how 'nullities,' in the abstract, 
differ from modern exclusionary rules. The workings of concrete 'nulli-
ties' and exclusionary rules will then be addressed in the succeeding 
parts of the article. 
n 'Nullities' in modern criminal procedure codes 
Many countries in Europe and Latin America still provide for 'nullities' 
when there is a violation of procedural norms. In some countries, such 
as France, procedural 'nullities' are still the only statutory grounds for 
excluding evidence. In others, such as Italy, Spain, Brazil, or Colombia, 
longer valid. Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586 at 597-9 (2006) [Hudson]. The economic 
crisis has caused drastic cuts in the budgets of police departments (as well as public 
defender offices) which could lead to an actual decline in the quality of justice 
delivered on both the investigative and the adjudicative ends of criminal 
proceedings in the United States. And violations of constitutional rights, such as 
failure to get a search warrant, are often just cost-cutting and time-saving measures 
not linked to any true exigent circumstance. 
34 I will be largely ignoring another substantial area of exclusionary doctrine in the 
United States relating to statements and physical evidence gathered as fruits of 
unlawful detentions or arrests. 
.. 
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the code has maintained the doctrine of 'nullities' and yet added modem 
statutory or even constitutional prohibitions on the use of illegally gath-
ered evidence. 
The relationship between modem rules of exclusion or 'non-usability' 
( inutilizzabilitii, to use the Italian term), which were often inspired by the 
American case law of the last fifty years, and the more venerable 'nulli-
ties,' which originally related to procedural acts and not necessarily to 
the evidence these acts might have produced, is often difficult (at least 
for a lawyer schooled in the common law!) to understand. For instance, 
one category of nullities, called 'nullities of general order' relates to 
defects in the procedure which do not necessarily touch on the collection 
of evidence, but are treated as grave violations which can even lead to dis-
missal of the prosecution.35 
Section 171 of CCP-France provides, 'There is a nullity when a failure 
to recognize a substantial formality contained in a provision of the 
present Code or any other provision of criminal procedure has infringed 
on the interests of the party to which it applies. '36 This formulation 
appears close to limiting France's nullity-based exclusionary rule to con-
stitutional violations, at least when the 'party to which it applies' is the 
defendant. Section 174(3) further provides that the annulled act will 
be removed from the case dossier. In civil-law systems, the withdrawal of 
the document memorializing an investigative measure from the dossier 
traditionally meant that no use could be made of it or its contents at 
the trial. 37 Since the document is excluded before the case reaches the 
trial court, the trial judge will be as insulated from the tainted evidence 
35 See Codice di Procedura Penale, § 178 (entered into force 22 October 1989) [CCP-Italy]. 
On 'general order' nullities in France, see Richard Frase, 'France,' in Craig M Bradley, 
ed, Criminal Procedurr: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 
2007) 213 [Fra~e]. 
36 Code de Procidurr Penale [CCP-France]. C6digo de Processo Penal§ 563 [CCP·Brazil] also 
limits nullities to violations which infringe on the interests of the prosecution or the 
defence; § 566 to violations which affect the ascertainment of the truth or the 
outcome of the trial. Spain's Organic Law on the Judicial Power provides for a 
'nullity' when: 'the essential rules of procedure are not respected and this may have 
caused an actual restriction of defense rights'; Ley Organica (LO) 6/1985, 1 July, Del 
Poder Judicial Y Del Ejercicio Potestad Jurisdiccional, § 238, online: <http:/ /noticias. 
juridicas.com/base_datos/ Admin/lofi.1985.html> [LOPJ-Spain]. 
37 In systems where the written trial still dominates, such as in the Netherlands or the 
French trial in the correctional courts, the documents in the dossier could 
historically be read at the trial. This is now changing because the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that the use of written statements may violate 
ECHR, suprd note 8, art 6(3)(d), which guarantees the right to confrontation. See 
inter alia, Delta v France (1993), 16 EHRR 574 and discussion in Stephen C Thaman, 
Comparative Criminal Procedurr: A Casebook Approach, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2008) at 125-35 [Thaman, Criminal Procedurr]. 
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as would be a jury in the United States following a successful pre-trial 
motion to exclude evidence. 
The CCP-Italy distinguishes between 'relative nullities,' which must be 
raised by the parties and if recognized may be 'sanitized' or cured by 
waiver by the affected party or by the official who violated the law,'8 
and 'absolute nullities,' which are usually of constitutional importance, 
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, may not be 'sanitized,' 
and may lead to exclusion of evidence.39 
Some nullity provisions also explicitly refer to derivative evidence. 
Thus, according to CCP-France, '[T] he 'annulled acts or documents 
are withdrawn from the investigative dossier' and it is 'prohibited to 
derive any information against the parties from the annulled act<; or 
documents.' 40 CCP-Italy also provides that ' [ t] he nullity of an act 
renders the subsequent acts invalid which depend on that declared to 
be annulled.' 41 
In Italy, the term 'nullity' usually refers to acts, whereas the term 'non-
usability' refers to evidence.•~ 'Non-usability' has been limited in the lit-
erature to cases where there is a statutory prohibition on the gathering 
of the evidence, whereas 'nullities' arise when legal formalities are vio-
lated in the gathering of what would otherwise be admissible evidence. 
The courts, however, have used the term 'non-usability' to apply both 
to both types of illegalities, creating a doctrinal murkiness. In 2001, the 
Italian Constitutional Court made it clear that the 'fruits of the poisonous 
tree' applies only to 'nullities' when expressly provided by statute, 
whereas CCP-Italy section 191, providing for 'non-usability,' has no 
language referring to derivative evidence!3 
CCP-Netherlands, which appears to be an adaptation of traditional 
nullity rules and applies to any 'procedural rule' gives the court discretion 
3R C:C:P-Italy, supra note 35, §§ 183-4. For similar provisions, see COdigo Procesal Penal 
Argentino§ 171 [CCP-Argentina·Federal]; COdigo Organico Processal Penal§§ 191 at 195 
[ CCP-Venezuelaj. 
39 CCP-Italy, ibid § 179. 
40 CPT-France, supra note 36, § 174 al para 3. French courts have based exclusion of 
'fruits' on these sections. Jean Pradel, Procedure penale, 9th cd (Paris: Cujas, 1997) at 
604-5 [Pradel]. 
41 Supra note 35§ 185(1). For similar language, see CCP-Brazil, supra note 36, § 573(1); 
CCP-Argentina-Federal, supra note 38, § 172; CCP-Venezuela, supra note 38 §§ 196 at 
para l. 
42 CCP·Italy, supra note 35, § 191. See Paolo Tonini, Manuale di Procedura Penale, 6th ed 
(Milan: Giuffre Editore, 2005) at 175. 
43 Italian Constitutional Court (24 September 2001), Decision No 332/2001, online: 
<http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2001/0332o-Ol.html> [Decision No 332/2001]; 
c.f Giovanni Canso & Vittorio Grevi, Commentario Breve al Nuovo Codice di Procedura 
Penale, 4th ed (Padua: CEDAM, 2002) at 339 [Conso & Grevi]. 
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to exclude evidence or impose other sanctions such as barring prosecu: 
tion or mitigating sentence and obligates it to 'take account of the inter-
est that the breached rule serves, the gravity of the breach and the harm it 
causes.'•• 
III Categorical 'pre-balanced' exclusionary rules 
A A CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE TN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE 
OF TORTURE AND OF CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT 
Although international and regional human rights conventions firmly 
protect the privilege against self-incrimination45 and the right to 
privacy,46 they do not categorically prescribe exclusion of evidence 
which is gathered as a direct or indirect result of the violations of these 
provisions. Indeed, the treaty language it:.o;;elf indicates that the right to 
privacy is not absolute. It may be violated, according to ECHR article 
8(2), 'in accordance with the law' and when 'necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or free-
doms of others. '•7 
The prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman, and degrad-
ing treatment, however, is treated as absolute. There is no qualifYing 
language in the treaty texts,'8 and states may not derogate from this pro-
tection, even in times of war or public emergency!9 Although the human 
rights treaties do not have built-in exclusionary rules, of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
(CAT) to which 146 nations are a party,50 clearly prohibits the use of state-
ments gathered through torture. But, oddly enough, the CAT does not 
provide an explicit exclusionary rule for statements gathered through 
44 l%tboek van Strafuardering § 359a [CCP-Netherlands]. 
45 ICCP, supra note 9, art 14(3)(g); ACHR, supra note 10, art 8(2)(g). The ECHR 
recognized the right to silence as being part of the right to a fair trial guaranteed 
under art 6(1); see ECHR]ohn Murray v The United Kingdom, [1996] 3, (1996), 22 
EHRR 29 at 60. 
46 UDHR, supra note 7, art 12; ICCP, ibid, art 17(1); ECHR, supra note 8, art 8(1); ACHR, 
supra note 10, art 11 (2). 
47 ECHR, ibid, art 8(2). UDHR, ibid, art 12 prohibits 'arbitrary' interference; ICCP, ibid, 
art 17 (1) prohibits 'arbitrary and unlawful' interference; and ACHR, ibid, art 11 (2), 
prohibits 'arbitrary and abusive' interference. 
48 UDHR, ibid, art 5; ICCP, ibid, art 7; ECHR, supra note 8, art 3; ACHR, ibid, art 5(2). 
49 ICCP, ibid, art 4(2); ECHR, supra note 8, art 15(3). 
50 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane ar Degrading Treatment ar Punishment, GA 
Res 39/46, UNGAOR, 39th Sess, Supp No 51, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984) § 15, online: 
<http:/ /treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONUNE&tabid~2&mtdsg_no~ 
N-9&chapter-4&lan~n#Participants > . 
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use of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."' The UN's 'Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment,' however, requires prosecutors to refuse to 
use as evidence statements obtained by torture 'or other ill treatment 
except in proceedings against those who are accused of using such 
means.'52 The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) also clearly held in the case of Giifgen v Germany that 
the use of any statements gathered through torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment would result in an unfair trial in violation of 
ECHR article 6.-'" 
Although CAT does not mention exclusion of the 'fruits of the poiso-
nous tree' derived from confessions under torture, it is presumed that the 
use of physical or other evidence derived from torture would also violate 
the treaty and international law. The ECtHR held in Giifgen that use of 
fruits of a tortured confession would automatically result in the violation 
of the right to a fair trial, though it admitted that its case law was not as 
categorical when it came to the fruits of 'inhuman or degrading' treat-
ment, also prohibited categorically by ECHR article 3.54 
In Giifgen, police threatened a Frankfurt law student with torture and 
brutality if he did not reveal the whereabouts of a child kidnap victim, 
who they thought was still alive. He made incriminating statements and 
took them to the lake where he had disposed of the child's body. A 
report of the autopsy conducted on the boy's body and evidence of the 
tire tracks of def~ndant's car ncar the lake were used at trial, though 
all his statements were suppressed.55 The ECHR Grand Chamber 
deemed that the threats constituted 'inhuman and degrading' treatment 
and were thus in violation ofECHR article 3 but did not rise to torture. It 
also found that, in such a case, the use of the fruits would not violate the 
ECHR right to a fair trial,"" using a kind of 'harmless error' analysis. Since 
51 Michael P Scharf, 'Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be 
Admissible?' (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 129 at 140. 
52 Ibid at 145. 
53 Gafgen v Germany (2011), .~2 EHRR 1 at42, para 166 [Gafgen]. It appears here that the 
ECtHR is treating the use of statements at trial, which were obtained as a result of the 
violation of ECHR, supra note 8, art 3, as absolute reversible error, not subject to any 
'harmless error' analysis. US Courts would likely apply the doctrine of 'harmless 
constitutional error' to such a situation, for so-called 'structural errors,' which 
constitute automatic reversible errors, are usually not related to the erroneous 
admission of evidence, and thus are much like 'nullities of general order' in civil-law 
systems; see note 37 supra and accompanying text. On structural and harmless 
constitutional error in the United States, see Wayne R LaFave et a!, Criminal 
Procedure, 5th ed (St. Paul: West, 2009) at 1323-31 [LaFave eta!]. 
54 Gafgen, supra: note 53 at 42, paras 166-7. 
55 Ibid at 6-7; 9-10, paras 15-8; 29-31. 
56 ECHR, supra note 8, art 6. 
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the defendant confessed his guilt at trial, the court found that his court-
room testimony was no longer the fruit of the article 3 violation since he 
was represented by counsel, and the court based its guilty judgment on 
the courtroom confession alone, only using the 'ill-gotten fruits' to corro-
borate its truthfulness." 
Despite the fact that the ECtHR in Gii[!!;en recognized certain exceptions 
to an absolute exclusionary rule for fruits of inhuman and degrading 
interrogation practices not amounting to torture, such as 'harmless error,' 
'inevitable discovery,''" and attenuation of the taint of the illegality, it also 
expressly disallows any 'balancing' of this 'absolute' violation against other 
interests, such as the 'the seriousness of the offence under investigation or 
the public interest in effective criminal prosecution,'59 which are at the 
core of Germany's balancing test, which will be discussed below. 
Long before the adoption of the CAT, national legal systems provided for 
categorical exclusion of statements obtained by threats, force, deception, 
promises, or other means, such as to render them 'involuntary,' which 
might fall short of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or torture. 
Thus, CCP-Germanf" prohibits the use of 'maltreatment, fatigue, physical 
intervention, the administration of substances, torture, deception, hypnosis, 
threats to apply measures not applicable according to the rules, or promises 
of a benefit not provided by law' during questioning and provides for a man-
datory exclusionary rule if the prohibitions are violated.61 
In 1897, the USSC held that, for statements taken in police custodial 
interrogation to be admissible under the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, they must 'not be extracted by any sort of 
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, 
however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.'62 
Between 1936 to 1966, the USSC also condemned interrogation practices 
ranging from clear torture to lesser modes of coercion, threats, promises, 
deception, and so forth which might or might not today rise to the level 
of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as violations of 'due process' 
and required reversals of thirty-five convictions based thereon."' I will 
discuss exclusionary rules dealing with 'involuntary' confessions which 
were induced by practices which do not rise to the level of torture or 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, below. 
57 Gafgen, supra note 53 at 44-6, paras 177-83. 
58 Ibid at 44, para 174. 
59 Ibid at para 175-6. 
60 Strafprvzessordnung !§ 136a [ CCP-Germany ]. 
61 Similar rules are common in other modern codes of criminal procedure as well; c.f 
CPP-Italy, supra note 35 § 64(3) and Ugolovno-protsessual'nyy kodeks Rnssiyskoy Federatsii 
(2001) § 9 [CCP-Russia]. 
62 Bram v United States, 168 US 532 at 542 (1897). 
63 For a summary of these 'voluntariness' cases, see LaFave et al, supra note 53 at 343-9. 
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B CATEGORICAL GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES APPLYING TO VIOLATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND SUB-CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY LAW 
A number of constitutions adopted by democratizing countries emerging 
from the clutches of totalitarian, authoritarian, or dictatorial regimes 
specifically require the exclusion of illegally gathered evidence. This is 
an important step, because some courts that require suppression of evi-
dence following a constitutional violation do not acknowledge that the 
exclusionary rule itself is of constitutional stature.64 
Some of these exclusionary provisions apply to evidence gathered in vio-
lation of statutory provisions which do not rise to violations of fundamental 
or constitutional rights. For instance, the 1993 Russian Constitution65 pro-
vides, 'In the administration of justice the use of evidence gathered in viola-
tion of federal law is not permitted. '66 Similarly, article 5 (LVI) of the Brazilian 
Constitution67 provides for inadmissibility of evidence obtained by 'illegal 
means. '68 Here, the constitutional legislator has already balanced, or to 
put it another way, has pre-empted all balancing by law giv.ers or lower-
court judges. In Russia, the extension of the provisions to errors of non-con-
stitutional gravity has been criticized. 59 
There are equally broad-sounding exclusionary rules in some of the 
new codes of criminal procedure. CCP-Italy (1988) provides for a sanc-
tion of 'non-usability' in relation to 'evidence acquired in violation of pro-
hibitions established by the law.' 7° CCP-Serbia (2006) goes even further: 
64 I am, of course, referring to the convoluted attempts by the USSC to characterize 
Mapp's, supra note 18, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda's, supra 
note 22, Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule (Miranda rule) as 'prophylactic' rules 
not required by the constitutional amendments they were originally designed to 
safeguard. See Leon, supra note 26 at 897, in relation to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule and, most recently, United States v Patane, 542 US 630 at 631 (2004) 
[Patane], in relation to the Miranda rule. 
65 Konstitutsiia Rossiyskoy Federatsii art 50(2) [Const. Russia]. 
66 For similar language, see Constitution of the Republic of Geurgia (1995) art 42(7) [Canst-
Georgia]; Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan ( 1995) art 71 (3) [ Const-Azerbaijan]; 
Constitution of the Republic of Belarus art 27(2); Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(1995) art 77(3)(9) [Const-Kazakhstan]. CCP-Russia, supra note 61, § 75(1), includes 
the same broad exclusionary mandate, as does Ugolavno-prvtsessual'nyy Kodeks 
Respubliki Belarus § 105(4)-(5) [CCP-Belarus]; Ugolovno-prvtsessual'nyy Zakon 
Respublika kazakhstan § 116 ( 4) [ CCP-Kazakhstan]; Ugolovno-prvtsessual'nyy Kodeks 
Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki § 6(3) [CCP-Kyrgyzstan]; Ugolavno-prvtsessual'nyy kodeks 
Turkmenistana § 125(4) [CCP-Turkmenistan]. 
67 Constitution of Brazil (1988) [Const-Brazil]. 
68 C.f Constitution of the Republic ofTurlrcy (1982) § 38 at para 8 [Const-Turkey] and Turkish 
Criminal Procedure Code§ 206(a) (2) [CCP-Turkey), which use similar language. 
69 See Stephen C Thaman, 'The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia' (1995) 31 Stan] 
lnt'l L 61 at 90-4, discussing exclusionary practices and criticism of the broad rule in 
jury trials in 1993-4. 
70 CCP-Italy, supra note 35, § 191. 
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Court decisions may not be based on evidence which per se, or by method of col-
lection is contrary to the provisions of the present Code, any other law, or has 
been collected or presented by virtue of violating human rights and fundamental 
freedoms envisaged by the Constitution or ratified international treaties.71 
Occasionally these broad exclusionary rules will even extend to derivative 
evidence; that is, to 'fruits of the poisonous tree.' Thus,§ 83 CCP-Slovenia 
(1994) provides that a court may not base a decision on evidence 
acquired in violation of constitutional rights and liberties, nor of other 
explicit norms of criminal procedure, nor on evidence derived from 
such violations. 72 
These broad rules seem to hearken back to equally broad 'nullity' pro-
visions which are rooted in a strict legality principle according to which 
any law violation nullifies the validity of the acts which are the results 
thereof. We will see, however, that the blind eye exercised by courts in 
relation to the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence seized in viola-
tion of statutory 'nullities' in traditional civil-law regimes also lacks acuity 
when it comes to interpreting modern exclusionary rules. 73 
C CATEGORICAL GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES RESTRICTED TO 
VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
. I believe the better approach is to limit categorical exclusionary rules to 
situations where fundamental or constitutional rights are violated. 74 A 
statute which I believe could be a model for other jurisdictions and 
that expressly extends to the 'fruits of the poisonous tree' is LOPJ-
Spain, which provides, 'Evidence obtained, directly or indirectly in viola-
tion of fundamental rights and liberties is without effect. '75 In a similar 
manner, CCP-Colombia provides for exclusion of' [a] II evidence obtained 
in violation of fundamental guarantees' and extends the prohibition to 
' [ e] vidence which is the consequence of the excluded evidence, or can 
only be explained by reason of its existence.'76 
7l Criminal Procedure Code § 15 [CCP-Serbia]. For a US statutory exclusionary rule 
extending to non-constitutional statutory violations, see Vernon's Ann Texas CCP art 
38.23. 
72 Criminal Procedure Act (2007) [CCP-Slovenia] § 83 [CCP-Slovenia]; see Zvonka Fiser 
et a!, La legislazione processuale penale della Repubblica di Slavenia, in Berislav Pavisi<': & 
Davide Bertaccini, eds, Le altre procedure penali: Transizioni dei sistemi processuali penali, 
vol 1 (Turin, Italy: G Giappichelli, 2002). 
73 The interpretation ofCCP-ltaly, supr.i note 35, § 191, is a good case in point. See Part 
E.ii.b.2 below. 
74 C.f 4 Or Rev Stat § 136.4320, which limits exclusion of evidence to situations when 
required by the constitutions of Oregon or the United States. 
75 Supra note 36, § 11.1. 
76 C6digos de Procedimiento Penal§ 23 [CCP-Colombia]. 
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Derivative evidence, however, is only a 'fruit' of the violation if there is 
a close causal connection between the violation and its discovery and the 
evidence would not have been discovered but for the violation. Some 
recent statutes explicitly provide for exceptions to exclusion developed 
in US jurisprudence. For instance, CCP-Brazil (2008) provides, 
Illicit evidence, understood to be that obtained in violation of constitutional and 
legal norms, is inadmissible and should be removed from the trial: (1) the evi-
dence derived from the illicit evidence is also inadmissible except where there 
is no obvious or causal nexus between the one and the other or where the 
derived evidence could be obtained from a source independent of the 
former; (2) An independent source is considered to be such, that when, follow-
ing the normal procedures used in practice which are proper in criminal inves-
tigation, it would be capable of leading to the facts which are the objects to be 
proved.77 
In a similar vein, CCP-Colombia explicitly makes exceptions for 'attenu-
ated connection, independent source, inevitable discovery, and others 
provided by law. '78 
IV ~at is a constitutional or fundamental right? 
A INTRODUCTION 
Assuming that most jurisdictions will only exclude probative evidence if 
the police violate a fundamental or constitutional right, it is still not 
always easy for courts or law givers to determine which violations fall 
into this category. Courts thus make value judgments which could be con-
sidered to be a balancing of the seriousness of the violation in relation to 
the legal interest protected by a constitutional proVIsiOn. The 
Constitution of Colombia states that 'evidence obtained in violation of 
due process is null in the full sense of the law (in plena derecho).' 79 We 
know from USSC case law that determining what is a violation of due 
process in the taking of a confession or 'probable cause' in the issuance 
of a warrant to search or wiretap can imply a complicated weighing of the 
'totality of the circumstances. '80 The Constitution of Portugal lists specific 
constitutional violations which will trigger exclusion: 'Any evidence 
77 Supra note 36, !i 157. 
78 Supra note 76, § 455. 
79 Constitution of Columbia (1991) art 29 [ Const-Columbia]. 
80 On the 'totality of the circumstances' approach related to the admissibility of arguably 
'involuntary confessions,' see LaFave et a!, supra note 53 at 343-Y. In relation to 
determining 'probable cause,' see Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 at 267-74 (1983) [Gates]. 
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obtained by torture, force, violation of the physical or moral integrity of 
the individual, wrongful interference in private life, the home, correspon-
dence, or telecommunications is of no effect.'"' 
We have already seen that the nullities approach adopted in many civil-
law criminal procedure codes differentiates between nullities which affect 
constitutional rights or substantial interests of the defendant, called 
'absolute' nullities or nullities of 'general order,' and those which are 
only relative and may be sanitized, and so on. The German Supreme 
Court, in a similar way, has found that '[i]f the procedural provision 
which has been violated, does not, or not primarily, serve to protect 
the defendant, then a prohibition on use will be unlikely; on the other 
hand, a prohibition on use is appropriate, when the violated procedural 
provision is designed to secure the foundations of the procedural pos-
ition of the accused or defendant in a criminal prosecution. '82 
The right to privacy in one's home and one's communications and the 
right to remain silent are core constitutional rights in all democracies, but 
it is also legal for poliCe to search homes, intercept private communi-
cations, and interrogate criminal suspects if they follow the correct pro-
cedures. Some of the procedures are directly required by constitutions 
or constitutional decisions of high courts because they affect the core 
interests protected by the constitutional rights if violated. Other rules dic-
tated by statute are often considered to be of lesser importance. I will 
assess what I believe to be the core rules in these two areas which 
should usually trigger exclusion of evidence if violated. 
B THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL 
INVASIONS OF PRIVACY 
i The requirement of probable cause and judicial authorization 
If a dwelling search or wiretap is based on probable cause and is judicially 
authorized, its constitutional underpinnings are normally guaranteed. I 
believe that these are the two core factors which, to use the language of 
the ECHR, are 'necessary in a democratic society'8 ' before authorities 
invade protected areas of privacy for the purposes of criminal investigation. 
If the investigative measure violates statutory rules which are unrelated to the 
amount of suspicion necessary to search or wiretap or to the fact of judicial 
authorization, then the Spanish courts, for instance, consider the violation 
to be an 'irregularity' rather than an 'illegality' and treat it like a 'relative 
81 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 7Lh revision (200!'1) art 32(6) [Const-Portugal] 
required. 
82 38 BGHSt 214 at 218-22; for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra 
note 37 at Ill [38 BGHSt 214]. 
83 Supra note 8, art 8. 
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nullity' which would not lead to exclusion of evidence.84 For example, in one 
Spanish case, the police conducted a search which was authorized by the 
investigating magistrate and based on sufficient suspicion, but neither the 
investigating magistrate nor his secretary were present during the search, vio-
lating a statutory norm regulating the execution of searches. The Spanish 
Supreme Court held that this error did not affect a fundamental right, 
and therefore the sanction was merely the annulment of the act document-
ing the search, making it inadmissible at trial. This, however, did not prevent 
the police who conducted the search from testifYing in court to prove the 
seizure of the drugs and the corpus delicti of the crime.85 
In principle, the USSC has also categorized certain violations of the laws 
regulating wiretaps and search warrants as being of sub-constitutional status 
so that violation does not require suppression. Thus, mistakes in the 
execution of an otherwise valid search warrant86 or wiretap87 will not lead 
to exclusion. By refusing to suppress the fruits of an otherwise constitution-
ally valid warranted search in Hudson v Michigan,"" despite a violation of the 
'knock and announce' requirement of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
41, the USSC has come to a result similar to that of the Spanish Supreme 
Court but had to resort to contorted reasoning because of a previous 
decision in which complying with the 'knock and announce' rule was 
declared to be constitutionally required."9 
There will, of course, be differences in the interpretation of what is an uncon-
stitutional search because, while the United States requires 'probable cause' for 
the i<>suance of a search warrant or wiretap,90 some other countries, such as 
Germany, Spain, or France, appear to require a lesser degree of suspicion.91 
84 On the notion that 'illicit evidence' is suppressible under LOPJ-Spain, supra note 36, § 
11.1 and that 'irregular' evidence falls under LOPJ-Spain, ibid § 238, the nullity 
provision, and does not lead to suppression of fruits of the violation, see Marien 
Aguilera Morales, 'Regia de exclusion y acusatorio' in Lorena Bachmaier Winter 
eta!, Proceso penal y sistemas acusatorios (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008) 93 [Morales]. 
85 Supreme Court of Spain, Decision of july 9, 1993, RJ 1993, No 6060, 7682 at 7682-3; 
for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 106-8. 
86 See the following two cases in which aspects of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41 
regulating serving of search warrants were violated: United States v Schoenheit, 856 F (2d) 
74 (8th Cir 1988), on violation of prohibition of night service; United States v Charles, 
883 F (2d) 355 (5th Cir 1989), on serving officer did not have warrant in hand. 
87 In relation to the wiretap statute, the provision must 'directly and substantially 
implement' the congressional intention to restrict the use of electronic surveillance 
or be 'intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme.' United States v 
Giordano, 416 US 505 at 527 (1974); United States v Chavez, 416 US 562 at 574 (1974). 
88 Supra note 33 at 594. 
89 See Wilwn v Arkansas, 514 US 927 (1995). The Court had to base its decision on the 
fact that the seizure of the evidence was not a 'fruit' of the unlawful entry; see also 
Hudson, ibid at 586-7. 
90 Described as a 'fair probability' that the thing searched for will be present in the 
indicated location; Gates, supra note 80 at 238. 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND THE TOLERATION OF POLICE LAWLESSNESS 709 
ii The constitutional exception for exigent circumstances 
Both the German and Italian Constitutions provide for an exception to 
the warrant requirement in cases of exigent circumstances, or what the 
Germans call 'danger in delay.' 92 This exception is universally recognized 
but can easily be abused, so it is important that it be narrowly construed 
to prevent large-scale evasion of the requirement of pre-search or pre-
wiretap judicial authorization. 
Although it was well-known that German law enforcement officials 
seldom, if ever, acquired search warrants"' and always (successfully) 
defended their warrantless searches retrospectively"• with a perfunctory 
incantation of the words 'danger in delay,' often attributed to the fact 
that there were no evening-duty judges to issue warrants, the appellate 
courts winked at this sleight of hand, claiming the trial judge's discretion 
could not be reviewed on appeal.95 The German Constitutional Court 
finally took note of this scandalous situation in 2001 and attempted to 
rectify the situation by limiting the exception for 'danger in delay' to 
cases that were clearly documented and by requiring judges to be on 
duty twenty-four hours for the purposes of issuing warrants."" 
To prevent such manipulation, the exception for 'exigent circum-
stances' should be limited to two fact situations: the 'flagrant crime'97 
and real emergency situations involving threat to human life, health, or 
property. An example of a statute that puts clear restrictions on the invo.,. 
cation of 'exigent circumstances' is the us federal wiretap statute, which 
allows warrantless wiretaps only in emergency situations that involve 
91 On the ncar complete discretion of French judges to search any place and seize 
anything that the judge deems 'useful to the manifestation of the truth,' see Frase, 
supra note 35 at 211. On the low substantive barriers to searches in Germany, where 
mere 'suspicion' is sufficient, see Thomas Weigend, 'Germany' in Craig M Bradley, 
cd, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic 
Press, 2007) 243 at 249 [Weigend]. For a Spanish investigating magistrate to order a 
search, there need only be 'indications' that the person or objects sought are 
located therein; Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal § 546 [CCP-Spain]. 
92 The exception for 'exigent circumstances' is found in Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany art 13(2) [Canst-Germany] and Constitution of the Italian 
Republic art 14 [Canst-Italy]. 
93 Weigend, supra note 91 at 250 estimated that only 10% of searches were conducted 
with warrants. 
94 In Germany and many other countries, police must acquire judicial validation of 
exigent searches within two or three days after the search; see CCP-Germany, s~pra 
note 60, § 98(2). 
95 Andreas Ransiek, 'Durchsuchung, Beschlagnahme und Verwertungsverbot' (2002) 10 
Dcr Strafverteidiger 565 at 566 [Ransiek]. In effect, only the most arbitrary searches 
ever led to exclusion of evidence; ibid. 
96 BVerfGE 103 at 142. 
97 An exception specifically included in Constituci6n Espanola de 27 diciembre 1978 art 18(2) 
[Canst-Spain]. 
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'immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person' or 
for conspiratorial activities that threaten 'the national security interest' 
or are 'characteristic of organized crime.'9" The USSC has also created 
an exception to the warrant requirement which allows police to enter a 
house with less than probable cause to save lives, prevent injuries, or 
protect property.99 
The 'flagrant crime' exception would apply to 'hot pursuit' cases,100 
where probable cause develops suddenly upon commi~sion of a crime 
and escape of the culprit or destruction of evidence is likely. If, 
however, the suspicion of the presence of dn1gs in a dwelling, for 
instance, comes as a result of an investigation, then, in principle, a 
warrant should be obtained. The police should not be able to create 
the need for exigent circumstances by, for instance, walking up to the 
target house and announcing they are present so as to create a pretext 
for entering to prevent the destruction of evidence. 101 
iii Instances where a constitutional violation permits of no further balancing 
Thus, when a home has been searched without a search warrant based on 
probable cause or without exigent circumstances, this should be con-
sidered to be a clear constitutional violation and exclusion should be 
the presumptive remedy. This was traditionally the approach of the 
USSC following Mapp102 until the 'good faith' test and 'cost-benefit' balan-
cing was introduced in Leon/03 as it was for the Spanish courts in interpret-
ing LOPJ-Spain section 11.1 104 until balancing was introduced in 1998, as 
long as the taint of the violation was not attenuated. The Irish Supreme 
Court, which initially employed a simple balancing test to determine 
admissibility of evidence,'"' changed course in 1990 and recognized a cat-
egorical exclusionary rule in cases where police clearly violate the consti-
tutional rights of citizens, rejecting even the 'good faith' exception 
recognized by the USSC. According to Judge Finlay in People (DPP) v 
Kenny, 'The detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons, no 
98 18 USC§ 2518(7) (a). The federal prosecutor must then request post factum approval of 
a judge within forty-eight hours. Such immediate review after an emergency invasion of 
privacy is otherwise not required for emergency searches in ·the United States. 
99 Bri{{ham City, Utah v Stuart, 547 US 398 at 403 (2006). Such searches should not, 
however, be pretexts for searches for evidence of crime. 
100 See Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294 al 310 (1967) [Warden]. 
101 See United States v Timberlake, 896 F (2d) 592 at 597 (DC Cir 1990); Dunnuck v State, 786 
A (2d) 695 at 699-700 (Md 2001) with respect to knocking on a door without warrant. 
But see contra United States v MacDonald, 916 F (2d) 766 at 772 (2d Cir 1990), allowing 
creation of exigent circumstances by knocking on the door. 
102 Supra note 18. 
103 Supra note 26. 
104 See text accompanying note 75 supra. 
105 See Peaple (AG) v O'Brien, [1965] IR 142 at 1fi0-1 SC (I). 
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matter how important they may be in relation to the ordering of society, 
cannot, however, in my view, outweigh the unambiguously expressed con-
stitutiomil obligation as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the per-
sonal rights of the citizen.' 106 
Categorical statutory exclusionary rules are otherwise clearly less 
common in relation to violations of the right to privacy than they are 
for violations of the right to counsel or silence in the context of interro-
gations. The great exception, however, is with violations of the wiretap sta-
tutes. Thus, when core provisions of the US wiretap statute have been 
violated, the federal code provides that 
no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived there-
from may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legis-
lative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political 
subdivision thereof. 107 
This is likely the broadest explicit statutory exclusionary rule in US law 
and clearly extends to 'fruits of the poisonous tree.' It also brooks of 
no exceptions based in 'standing' or 'good faith' mistakes. 10" CCP-Italy 
also expressly prohibits use of the 'results of interceptions' made in viola-
tion of the wiretap statute. 109 
A key reason for court reluctance to exclude evidence gained from vio-
lations of the right to privacy has been that such violations usually occur 
unrelated to the violation of any trial right such as the privilege against 
self-incrimination and thus, in the words of the German Supreme 
Court, will not affect the 'procedural position' of the defendant, or in 
the approach of the ECtHR, will not affect the right to a fair trial pro-
tected by ECHR article 6. 110 
C CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON TNTF:RROGATTON PRAGTIC:F:S 
i Admonitions as to the right to silence and to counsel 
While the use of means such as torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment; and lesser tactics which render a confession 'involuntary' 
clearly constitute a fundamental rights violation that leads to suppression 
106 [1990] 2 IR 110 at 134 SC (I) (Finlay CJ). 
107 18 usc § 2515. 
108 See United States v Rice, 478 F (3d) 704 at 711-2 (6th Cir 2007), which finds there is no 
'good faith' exception to the wiretap exclusionary rule. 
109 Supra note 35, § 271. 
110 In Leon, supra note 26 at 906, the USSC stated that the wrong perpetrated by the Fourth 
Amendment violation is 'fully accomplished' at the time of the illegal search and no 
'new Fourth Amendment wrong' is perpetrated by admitting illegally seized evidence 
into the trial. The 'fair trial' test of the ECtHR will be discussed in Part IV-B below. 
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of an ensuing statement, another very important procedural rule is the 
requirement that a suspect or defendant be aware of the right to 
silence and the right to counsel before being questioned.lll Whereas 
the former, more egregious violation constitutes an attack on human 
dignity and sometimes bodily integrity, the latter is more of a procedural 
error which undermines the defendant's ability to defend herself during 
the criminal trial. 
The warnings made famous in the USSC's landmark decision of 
Miranda v Arizonam were deemed by the majority in that case to be 
firmly rooted in the Fifth Amendment and therefore constitutionally 
required to dissipate the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation. 
The consequence of a violation of the rules the Court laid down was 
exclusion of the statement<; gathered following the violation. The USSC 
also claimed that it is with custodial interrogation that 'our adversary 
system of criminal proceedings commences.' 113 In a similar vein, the 
German Supreme Court has proclaimed that the German variant of 
Miranda warnings are 'designed to secure the foundations of the pro-
cedural position of the accused.' Exclusion of a statement taken in viola-
tion of the German Miranda-warnings is mandated even if the suspect 
interrogated was out of custody, as long as probable cause existed to 
arrest him for the crime which was the subject of the interrogation.114 
Although most democratic countries have adopted the teaching of 
Miranda, the constitutional underpinnings of the rule have been called 
into question in the country of their origin. In 1971, the USSC began per-
mitting the use of a statement taken in violation of the Miranda rules in 
order to impeach a defendant whose courtroom testimony contradicted 
it.115 By 1974, the violation of the Miranda rules was no longer character-
ized as a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but as a 'prophylactic 
rule' the violation of which would not affect the use of the 'fruits of 
the poisonous tree.' 116 Although the USSC reversed course in 2000 and 
declared that the Miranda warnings were of constitutional status, m it 
refused to reverse the exceptions to the exclusionary rule based in its 
Ill Most European and Latin American jurisdictions now require that persons subject to 
police interrogation be admonished of their right to confer with counsel and their 
right to remain silent before being interrogated; see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 37 at 85-96. In general, see Stephen C Thaman, 'Miranda in 
Comparative Perspective' (2001) 45 Saint Louis ULJ 581. 
112 Supra note 22. 
113 Ibid at 477. 
114 38 BGHSt 214, supra note 82 at 218-22, 224-5. 
115 Harris v New York, 401 US 222 at 225-6 (1971). 
116 Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433 at 438-9,450 (1974). 
117 Dickim;nn v United States, 530 US 428 at 437-8 (2000). 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND THE TOLERATION OF POLICE LAWLESSNESS 713 
sub-constitutional status and a plurality of the Court recently returned to 
calling Miranda warnings mere 'prophylactic' safeguards not themselves 
required by the Fifth Amendment in holding that physical evidence 
found as a result of a Mirandardefective confession is admissible. 118 
ii The actual right to counsel before and during interrogations 
Although the Miranda decision clearly intimated that an uncharged suspect 
in custody must be advised of the right to have counsel present during the 
entire interrogation, 119 the Court never required that police assure that 
those facing interrogation are actually able to speak to lawyers before decid-
ing whether they will waive their rights.120 Police can even tell suspects that no 
lawyer will be provided until they are charged and go to court' 2' or refuse to 
tell a suspect that a lawyer has been actually retained. 122 An invocation of the 
right to counsel will certainly prevent any further interrogation of a jailed 
uncharged suspect even as to different charges unless the defendant reiniti-
ates contact with the interrogators,123 but the dissent of Justice White in 
Miranda already expressed doubt as to whether a waiver of the right to 
counsel allowed by the majority could ever truly considered to be voluntary 
if custody was per se coercive in the first place.124 
As a result, the overwhelming majority of suspects in the United States 
waive their Miranda rights and speak to police without ever having talked 
to a lawyer. 125 Although the USSC originally held that once a person is 
charged and is represented by counsel or has requested or been assigned 
counsel, no interrogation may take place in the absence of counsel or 
without counsel's consent. But that rule was recently overruled by the 
USSC, and the Miranda rules now apply whether or not the suspect is 
represented by counsel. 126 
118 Patane, supra note 64 at 632. 
119 Supra note 22 at 492. This was clearly reaffirmed in Florida v Pawel~ 130 S Ct 1195 at 
1211 (2010). 
120 The Miranda court, supra note 22 at 474, said it was not necessary to have a system of 
'station house lawyers' ready to advise incarcerated suspects as is required in England 
and Wales under the system of 'duty solicitors'; see England and Wales, Code of 
Practice (C) at para 6.6(a)-(c) [PACE]. 
121 California v Prysock, 453 US 3!\!\ (1981); Duckworth v Eagan, 442 US 195 (1989). 
122 Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412 at 422 (1986). The Court stated, 'No doubt the additional 
information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps it even might have 
affected his decision to confess.' 
123 Edwards v Arizona, 4!\1 US 477 (1981) [Edwards]; Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988). 
124 Supra note 22 at 536-7 (White, dissenting). 
125 According to one study, only around one quarter of suspects elected to remain silent. 
Richard Leo, 'The Impact of Miranda Revisited' (1996) 86 J Crim L & Criminology 621 
at 657-9. 
126 Montejo v Louisiana, 129 S Ct 2079 at 2085, 2089-91 (2009). 
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Unlike in the United States, however, in Europe the right actually to 
consult with counsel before and during interrogation is obtaining indubi-
table constitutional status as a fundamental right. According to CCP-
Russia, for example, no pre-trial statement made by a defendant to law 
enforcement officials which was given in the absence of counsel may 
be used at trial if the defendant retract<> the statement at or before. trial 
even if the suspect waived the right to counsel. 127 A similar rule has 
been recognized in Spain. 12" In Italy, the denial of the assistance of 
counsel constitutes a nullity of general order and, in the context of 
police interrogation, an 'absolute nullity' which cannot be sanitized 
and must be raised ex officio by the judge. 129 Exclusion follows even if 
the suspect offers a statement voluntarily in the absence of counsel. 1' 0 
Traditionally, some European regimes gave the police a determinate 
period to interrogate suspects (called garde a vue in France and 
Belgium) and the right to counsel was only recognized for subsequent 
interrogation by an investigating magistrate. 131 In 2008, however, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Salduz v Turkey 132 held that the right 
to counsel, guaranteed by ECHR article 6(3) (c) applies not only at trial 
but also during the investig-ative stage and most assuredly during 
the first police interrogation. Any conviction based on an admission or 
statement taken in violation of this right constitutes a violation of 
the general right to a fair trial guaranteed under ECHR article 6(1). 
127 CCP-Russia, supra note 61, § 75(2) (1). This provision was introduced due to the 
prevalent use of coercion by Russian criminal investigators, not only in inducing 
confessions, but also in inducing waivers of counsel prior to interrogation. Cf 
Stephen C Thaman, 'The Nullification of the Russian Jury; Lessons for Jury-Inspired 
Reform in Eurasia and Beyond' (2007) 40 Cornell Int'l LJ 355 at 375-8. 
128 See CCP-Spain, supra note 91, §§ 520(2) (a) -(c) and discussion in Eduardo de Urbano 
Castrillo & Miguel Angel Torres Morato, La Prueba lllicita Penal: Estudio jurisprudencial, 
3d ed (Navarr£L, Spain; Thomson; Aranzadi, 2003) at 78 [lJrbano Castrillo & Torres 
Morato]. 
129 CCP-Italy, supra note 35, §§ 178(l)(c), 179(1), 350(3), and discussion in Marilena 
Colamussi, 'In tema di deducibiliti della nulliti derivante dalla violazione del diritto 
dell'imputato in stato di custodia cautelare di conferire con il proprio difensore' in 
Vincenzo Perchinunno, ed, Percorsi di Procedura Penale. Dal garantismo inquisitorio a un 
accusatorio non garantito (Milan; Giuffre, 1996) at 37. 
130 CCP-Italy, ibid§ 350(6,7). 
131 On how much easier it was for police to get confessions in the absence of counsel than 
during questioning by the fuge d'instruction, see Pradel, supra note 40 at 386-97. Today, 
the suspect in police custody is not advised of the right to counsel but may request to 
see counsel during Karde a vue, but the inten~ew may not exceed thirty minutes and the 
lawyer has no right to be present during police interrogation. CCP-France, supra note 
36, §§ 63-4. In Belgium, there was no right to counsel even during interrogation 
before the investigating magistrate; see Laurens van Puyenbroeck, 'Belgium' in Ed 
Cape et al, eds, Effective Criminal Defence in J;;'urope (Oxford, UK: Intersentia, 2010) 78. 
132 (2009), 49 EHRR 421 [Salduz]. 
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The Court said, 'The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrieva-
bly prejudiced when incriminating statements made during 
police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a convic-
tion.'133 The Grand Chamber did, however, allow for waivers of fair trial 
rights134 and this could be interpreted as allowing the right to waive the 
right to counsel during the first interrogation.135 
The decisions subsequent to Salduz, however, indicate that the ECtHR 
has in mind a right to counsel during pre-trial interrogation that is signifi-
cantly stronger than that articulated in Miranda or its diluted post-
Warren Court progeny. First of all, the Court makes it clear that a 
waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal and cannot be pre-
sumed from the fact that the suspect answers questions after having 
acknowledged understanding of his rights. A valid waiver must be 
knowing and intelligent, which means that 'he could reasonably have 
foreseen what the consequences would bc.' 136 The ECtHR further held 
that it violates the right to counsel to continue questioning a suspect 
who has asked for counsel, unless the suspect has spoken to counsel or 
reinitiates the contact with police. 137 It also found that subsequent con-
fessions where the defendant did arguably waive his Miranda rights did 
not attenuate the taint of the previous confessions given without 
counsel. 138 Finally, the ECtHR clearly linked the right to remain silent 
with the presumption of innocence and the notion that the prosecution 
must prove its case 'without resort to evidence obtained through coercion 
or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused.''"" 
133 Ibid at 435-9. 
134 Ibid at 438, para 59. 
135 However, in a later case, Oleg Kolesnik v Ukmine, No 17551/02 (19 November 2009) 
(EHCR) at para 37, Lhe ECtHR held that ECHR, supra note 8, art 6, had been 
violated in a case where the defendant signed a waiver of the right Lo counsel and 
confessed because he credibly alleged that police had coerced him to waive the right. 
136 Pishchalnikov v Russia, No 7025/04, (24 September 2009) at paras 76-7 (ECHR) 
[Pishchalnikov]. The EGtHR emphasized that the defendant was questioned about 
grave crimes such as murder after having been arrested for another crime and that 
only with counsel could he have assessed the consequences of agreeing to ·the 
interrogation. Ibid at para 80. In contrast, the USSC recently ruled that an 
unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights, including the right to counsel, is no longer 
necessary and may be inferred from the fact that the defendant eventually answers 
questions; sec Berghuis v Thompkins, 130 S Ct 2250 at 2260-2 (2010). 
137 Pishchalnikov, ibid at para 79. The language seems plucked from Edwards, supra note 
123 at 484. 
138 Pishchalnikvu, ibid at para 81-2. Here the ECtHR made a finding similar to that in 
Missouri v Seibert, 542 US 600 at 601 (2004), which held that a Miranda waiver after a 
preceding statement taken in wilful violation of the Miranda rules could not be 
deemed to be knowing. 
139 Zaichenlw v Russia, ~o 39660/02 (18 February 2010) at para 38 (ECHR). 
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The decisions in Salduz and its progeny are definitely a threat to the 
garde a vue procedures in France and Belgium and are quickly leading 
to changes in other parts of Europe.140 
iii Exigent circumstances in relation to interrogations? 
The Salduz court admitted that there are possible restrictions on the right 
to counsel at the first interrogation: 'The question, in each case, has 
therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so, whether, 
in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not deprived the 
accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction is capable of 
doing so in certain circumstances.141 A typical example would be the 
restriction allowed in Code of Practice C of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) in England and Wales, when the right to 
speak to a duty solicitor may be postponed if 'delay will involve an 
immediate risk of harm to persons or serious loss of, or damage to, prop-
erty.'142 The USSC has also recognized an exception to the need to give a 
suspect the Miranda warnings when 'prompted by a concern for the 
public safety.' 143 
On the other hand, the ECtHR has made it clear that there are no 
exceptions to the prohibition against torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatment provided by ECHR article 3 even in the 'fight against terrorism 
and organized crime' or to save human life. 144 
D FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
This summary suggests that, in addition to the right against torture and 
cruel and inhuman treatment, discussed above, the right to privacy 
within one's home and the right against self-incrimination also fall into 
the category of fundamental rights. Evidence obtained in violation of 
these rights should normally be excluded. 
140 In early March 2011, the Belgian Senate approved a law providing for counsel before 
the first interrogation. 'Le Senat adopte Ia loi Salduz: les droits des justiciables 
renforces' (3 March 2011), online: rtbf.be <http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/ 
detail_le-senat-adopte-la-loi-salduz-les-droits-dujusticiable-renforces?id=5714303 > ; in 
France, the Conseil constitutionnel ordered in April 2011 that Salduz be 
implemented in France, and lawyers stormed the jails demanding to represent their 
clients. Marion Isobel, 'Case Watch: Salduz fever sweeps Europe' opm Society Blog 
(26 April 2011), online: Open Society Foundations <http://blog.soros.org/2011/04/ 
case-watch-salduz-fevei~sweeps-europe/ > . 
141 Salduz, supra note 132 at 436, para 52. 
142 PACE, supra note 120, art 6.6(b)(i). 
143 New York v Qyarles, 467 US 649 at 656 (1984). 
144 Giifgtm, supra note 53 at 23, 27 at para 87, 107. 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND THE TOLERATION OF POLICE LAWLESSNESS 717 
v Balancing by the courts 
A INTRODUCTION 
I have tried to articulate what violations would constitute fundamental or 
constitutional violations in a democratic country which respects human 
rights. This is clearly the case when interrogation methods are used 
that violate CAT or render a statement involuntary, and the consensus 
is growing for imposing a bright-line rule for interrogations in violation 
of the right to counsel. I would also make this claim in relation to viola-
tions of the right to privacy in one's domicile and private communi-
cations, when law enforcement authorities proceed without judicial 
authorization or probable cause in the absence of exigent circumstances. 
In some jurisdictions, the primary evidence and sometimes the actual 
'fruits of the poisonous tree' are suppressed upon such a finding. 
But this is not the case in the majority of jurisdictions, where courts 
tend to balance even clear constitutional violations against other impor-
tant interests and often will suppress neither the direct nor the derivative 
evidence emanating from them. The use of any balancing test where fun-
damental rights have been violated, therefore, threatens to subordinate 
the right to other interests that have less (if any) constitutional signifi-
cance; on the other hand, unlawfully obtained evidence that does not 
involve violations of fundamental rights may be admitted or excluded, 
depending on the balance of interests. In the rest of this section, I 
review the main tests and factors that courts have used in balancing inter-
ests. I will first examine three general tests, which I call the 'fair trial' test, 
the judicial integrity' test,' and the 'public interest' test. I will then 
examine separate factors used in these tests such as the 'good faith' of 
the violating officer, the seriousness of the violation, the question of 
whether the evidence was actually the 'fruit' of the violation, the impor-
tance of the evidence to determining the truth, and the seriousness of 
the offence for the proof of which the illegally gathered evidence has 
been proffered. 
B THE 'FAIR TRIAL' ASSESSMENT 
The PACE provides that 
[i]n any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evi-
dence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an 
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it. 145 
145 PACE, supra note 120, art 78(1). 
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In employing its 'fair trial' test, the ECtHR traditionally defers to domestic 
exclusionary practices. Thus, although the Court has found violations of 
the right to privacy under ECHR article 8, in many cases involving illegal 
wiretapping or interception of private conversations, it has consistently 
held, that 
[i]t is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether 
particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may 
be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question 
which must be answered is whether the pmceedings as a whole, including the way 
in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of 
the 'unlawfulness' in question and, where violation of another Convention 
right is concerned, the nature of the violation found. 11" 
When the Spanish Constitutional Court held in 1984 that evidence 
seized. in violation of the constitution had to be suppressed, it grounded 
the prohibition of use on (1) the violation of a fair trial with all the 
guarantees established by law (article 24 of the Spanish Constitution); 
(2) a denial of equality of arms, in the sense that the defence is not 
allowed to violate the law in order to produce evidence; and (3) a viola-
tion of the presumption of innocence, which in Spanish law restricts the 
prosecutor to the use of legally gathered evidence to rebut the 
presumption. '47 
Thus, whereas Spain finds a categorical violation of the right to a fair 
trial if the fruits of a violation of constitutional magnitude are used at 
trial, PACE article 78(1) gives the court what has been described in 
the literature as 'broad and unstructured' discretion to balance a 
plethora of factors against the illegality of police actions, such as the ser-
iousness of the offence, good faith of the officers, the type of evidence 
and its reliability, the existence of corroborative evidence, the type of 
illegality, and the type of right infringed. 148 We can see here that the 
'fair trial' criterion is flexible enough that, with so many factors in the 
balance, each judge can put his or her own stamp on what is a 'fair 
trial. '149 
146 Allan v United Kingdom (2003), 36 EHRR 12 at 143, 155-6, para 42. The first important 
case taking this approach was Schenck v Switzerland ( 1988), 13 EHRR 242 at 264, para 46. 
To my knowledge, the ECtHR has never found a violation of the right to a fair trial 
based solely on the use of evidence seized in violation of the right to privacy under 
ECHR, suprd note 8, art 8. 
147 STC 114/1984 (29 November 1984), discussed in de Urbano Castrillo & Torres Morato, 
supra note 128 at 11-2; Aguilera Morales, supra note 84 at 84-8. 
148 David Ormerod, 'ECHR and the Exclusion of Evidence: Trial Remedies for Article 8 
Breaches?' (2003) Crim L Rev 61 at 64. 
149 According to Andrew Ashworth, 'Excluding Evidence As Protecting Rights' (1977) 
Crim L Rev 723 '[I]f courts arc allowed simply to pick and choose the guiding 
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C PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURTS 
Peter Duff correctly notes that, if exclusionary rules are to have any 
meaning they must be 'extrinsic' and not anchored in the 'intrinsic' 
emphasis on probative value/credibilityY" The notion of judicial integ-
rity' is such an 'extrinsic' justification for exclusion; yet scholars differ 
as to its theoretical underpinnings, differentiating among (1) the 'disci-
plinary' model adopted by the United States which focuses on deterrence 
of unconstitutional police conduct; (2) the 'vindicatory' model, which 
focuses on protecting citizens' constitutional rights and would tend to 
automatic exclusion once a significant violation has been ascertained; 151 
and (3) the 'moral legitimacy' approach, which balances the seriousness 
of the constitutional violation and the harm to the public if a dangerous 
criminal were to go free.''" 
For the Mapp court, of course, the 'imperative of judicial integrity' was 
vindicatory and meant that 'the criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the 
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly 
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the 
charter of its own existence.''53 The Court in Leon abandoned this high 
ground by equating judicial integrity with the exclusively disciplinary 
rationale, aimed only at deterring police and not at judicial errors. 154 
Article 24(2) of the Canadian Charter dearly proclaims judicial integ-
rity as the basis for exclusion: '[W] here ... a court finds that evidence was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any of the rights or free-
doms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is 
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission 
of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into dis-
repute.'155 In interpreting this provision, Canadian courts originally 
principle(s) in the circumstances of any individual case, there is unlikely to be a 
consistent approach and a danger of the question of admissibility being left to the 
'whim of the particular court' [Ashworth]; cited in Peter Duff, 'Admissibility of 
Improperly Obtained Physical Evidence in the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Search 
for Principle' (2004) 8 Ed L Rev 152 at 159 [Duff]. 
150 Ibid at 159. 
151 The New Zealand courts have rejected the deterrent rationale and focus exclusively on 
'vindication of the right' Lhat has been breached, though they still engage in balancing; 
see Richard Mahoney, 'Abolition of New Zealand's Prima Facie Exclusionary Rule' 
(2003) Crim L Rev 607 at 610. The Hawai'ian Supreme (.;ourt recognizes judicial 
integrity, deterrence, and the protection of privacy as foundations of its exclusionary 
rule. State v Bridges, 925 P (2d) 357 at 365 (Hawai'i 1996) [Mahoney]. 
152 Duff, supra note 149 at 160-74. 
153 Mapp, supra note 18 at 659. 
154 Leon, supra note 26 at 916. 
155 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11. Article 35(5) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 was patterned after the Can~dian Charter and 
720 UNIVERSI1Y OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 
developed two separate tests to delermine whether exclusion was 
appropriate. Under the first test, exclusion would result, regardless of 
the seriousness of the violation, if it had as a consequence that a 
suspect-defendanl was 'conscripted' to produce evidence against 
himself. The second test focused exclusively on the seriousness of the vio-
lation such that a failure to exclude would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Important factors here would be the intentionality 
of the violation and whether police acted in 'good faith' but not whether 
there might have been a hypothetical clean path to the evidence (i.e., 
inevitable discovery). 156 Recently, the Canadian courts have moved to a 
simpler balancing test, which now includes the 'moral legitimacy' cri-
terion. The test involves the weighing of three factors: ( 1) the severity 
of the violation; (2) the question of whether the admission of the evi-
dence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute from the 
perspective of society's interest in respect for Charter rights; and (3) 
the effect. of admitting the evidence on the public interest in having 
the case adjudicated on its merits. 157 
D THE PUBLIC IMPACT OF THE ADMISSIBILITY DECISION 
CCP-Taiwan (as amended in 2003), requires the court to balance 'the 
protection of human rights and the preservation of public interests' in 
deciding whether or not to exclude illegally gathered evidence. 158 In 
1950, the Scottish High Court developed a test which balanced '(a) the 
interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions 
of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to 
secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necess-
ary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from Courts of law 
on any merely formal or technical ground. ' 159 
But what is the 'public interest'? This could mean that the public 
would be appalled if evidence resulting from torture or pervasive 
contains similar language, mandating exclusion if 'the admission of that evidence 
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice'; see PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe, 'South Africa' in Craig M Bradley, 
ed, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic 
Press, 2007) 471 at 487-8 [Schwikkard & van der Merwe]. 
156 Kent Roach, 'Canada' in Craig M Bradley, ed, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d 
ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007) 57 at 71-2 [Roach]. 
157 See R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at paras 95-7, [2009] SCR 353 [Grant]; R v Harrison, 2009 
SCC 34 at para 2, [2009] SCR 494. For a positive assessment of this change, see Don 
Stuart, 'Welcome Flexibility and Better Criteria from the Supreme Court of Canada 
for Exclusion of Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms' (2010) 16 Southwestern Journal of International Law 313. 
158 Taiwan Constitution art 158-4 [CCP-Taiwan]. 
159 Lawrie v Muir, 1950JC 19 at 26 (HCJ Scot). 
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warrantless wiretapping were used in the courts. 160 It could also refer to 
'the public's interest in maintaining the integrity of the courts and in 
ensuring the observance of the law and minimum standards of propriety 
by those entrusted with powers of law enforcement,' as stated by the 
Australian High Court, which returns us to the interests of judicial 
integrity. 161 
In Leon, the USSC proclaimed, 
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of 
Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern. Our cases have 
consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction 
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the 
truth-finding functions of judge and jury ... particularly, when law enforcement 
officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been 
minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants 
offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.162 
Thus, the USSC posits a 'public interest' in 'having juries receive all 
probative evidence of a crime.' 163 More recently, the Court bemoaned 
the exclusionary rule's 'costly toll upon truth-seeking,' which consists in 
'letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.' 164 Exclusion, 
for the USSC, is now a 'last resort' 165 subject to a balancing test that pits 
the exclusionary rule's 'deterrence benefits' against its 'substantial 
social costs.' 166 
With the USSC's disciplinary, cost-benefit approach, the 'intrinsic' 
emphasis on not losing probative evidence is pushing back the vindicat-
ory interest in protecting constitutional rights, paving the way for a poss-
ible return to the old common-law presumption of admissibility of 
relevant evidence or its inquisitorial counterpart, which prioritized 
truth over rights. 
E APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TESTS ONCE A CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION HAS BEEN DETERMINED 
i Was the constitutional violation excusable? Questions of 'good faith ' and 
lack of intentionality 
160 See Duff, supra note 149 at 155, providing examples of this sort 
161 Ridgeway v the Q!,teen, [1995] HCA 66, 184 CLR 19 at 38, cited to CLR in Craig M 
Bradley, 'Mapp Goes Abroad' (2001) 52 Case Western Reserve Law Review 375 at 380 
[Bradley, 'Mapp']. 
162 Leon, supra note 26 at 907-8. 
163 Murray, supra note 25 at 537. 
164 Herring v United States, 129 S Ct 695 at 697 (2009) [Herring]. 
165 Ibid at 700. 
166 Hudson, supra note 33 at 591. 
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Once the German courts determine that the interest violated is of consti-
tutional magnitude, they next examine the gravity of the violation; that is, 
whether it was in conscious disregard of the law or only inadvertent or 
negligent. 167 A similar test has been adopted by the Australian High 
Court, whereby the Court should take into consideration whether or 
not there was bad faith on the part of the police and also how easy it 
would have been to comply with the law. 168 The Scottish courts also 
occasionally refer to whether there was bad faith on the part of the 
police in deciding whether to exclude. 169 CCP-Netherlands gives the 
court discretion to exclude evidence and obligates it to 'take account 
of the interest that the breached rule serves, the gravity of the breach 
and the harm it causes.'' 7" 
In 1998, the Spanish Constitutional Court admitted a 'good faith' 
exception to the otherwise categorical exclusionary rule codified in 
lDPJ-Spain article 11.1.' 7 ' It made the nice distinction between 'natural' 
and juridical' causation. The Court analysed the extent to which an 
illegal wiretap tainted the other evidence in terms of the right to a 'fair 
trial;' referring directly to the approach taken by the ECtHR in this 
respect.' 72 It analysed whether the violation was of a required 'intensity' 
and then used a balancing test to determine whether there was an 'anti-jur-
idical' nexus between illegality and the derivative evidence. It determined 
that the violation was not so 'intense' due to the fact that the police did get 
a wiretap order and the violation was based on a lack of probable cause. 
The Court also noted that such an 'error' was not intentional and not 
grossly negligent, and that under the totality of the circumstances, the 
derivative evidence could be used. 173 Here we see an incorporation of 
the 'good faith' rule articulated in Leon in relation to wiretaps, a step 
even the USSC has not yet taken. 
In Leon, the USSC introduced the 'good faith' exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule in a case in which a magistrate erroneously 
issued a search warrant based on what a police officer believed in 'good 
faith' constituted probable cause. The USSC held that, though the Fourth 
Amendment was violated, excluding the illegally obtained evidence 
would only be appropriate to deter unlawful police conduct if the 
167 Weigend, supra note 91 at 251. 
168 Bunning v Cross, (1978) 141 CLR 54, cited in Bradley, 'Mapp,' supra note 161 at 380 
[Bunning]. 
169 See Edgley v Rarbtmr, 1994 SCCR 789 at 792 (HCJ Scot), cited in Duff, supra note 149 at 
165. 
170 Netherlands-CCP, supra note 41, S 359a(l). 
171 STC 81/1998 (4 February 1998), online: <http://www.boe.es/aeboejconsultas/ 
bases_ datos/ doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=SENTENCIA-1 998-0081 > [STC 81 /1998] 
172 See Part IV-B below. 
173 STC 81/1998, supra note 171. 
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officer intentionally or recklessly submitted a clearly inadequate or 'bare 
bones' affidavit of probable cause or false evidence to the magistrate.' 74 
The USSC has also extended the 'good faith' exception to other areas 
where the magistrate erred, such as where the search warrant itself con-
tained an erroneous or inadequate description of the things to be 
seized or the places to be searched175 or where an unlawful detention 
was based on erroneous court records. 176 Finally, however, the Court has 
lowered the bar recently to allow admission of evidence which was gath-
ered when the police were guilty of 'isolated negligence' in believing 
there was probable cause.177 
Since the assessment of probable cause - that is, a 'fair probability' that 
a crime has been committed or that evidence of that crime is to be found 
in a particular place - is a value judgment based on the 'totality of the cir-
cumstances,' I believe that a narrow exception can be allowed in borderline 
cases where 'reasonable minds may differ on the question whether a par-
ticular affidavit establishes probable cause,' 178 when the officer has followed 
the search warrant procedure and submitted the case to an impartial 
magistrate. I also believe that 'good faith' could save evidence derived 
from police procedures which were allowed by law or high-court jurispru-
dence when they were performed but where the standards became stricter 
after the measure was undertaken.' 79 I believe the exception for police neg-
ligence is, however, going too far. I agree with Justice Ginsburg's dissent in 
Herring that tort liability for negligence is considered to deter careless 
conduct in citizens, and if the Fourth Amendment exclusionary is meant 
to deter, it should encompass negligent conduct as well. 180 
ii Was the evidence the 'fruit' of the constitutional violation? 
a Introduction 
Even if a system recognizes the extension of the exclusionary rule to 
derivative evidence, the question still remains as to whether the evidence 
to be admitted really owes its existence to the constitutional violation; that 
174 Leon, supra note 26 at 915-2~. 
175 Massachusetts v Shepard, 468 US 981 at 988-90 ( 1984), decided on the same day as Leon, 
supra note 26. 
176 Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1 at 14-5 (1995). 
177 Herring, supra note 164 at 702. 
178 Leon, supra note 26 at 914. 
179 For instance, the USSC recently limited the scope of a search incident to an anest of a 
vehicle; see Arizona v Cant, 129 S Ct 1710 (2009). Several courts have refused to 
suppress evidence gathered in searches which abided by the earlier rule but violated 
the new Cant strictures; see State v Baker, 229 P (3d) 650 at 668 (Utah 2010); State v 
Danie~ 242 P (3d) 1186 at 1195 (Kan 2010); United States v Davi~, .~98 F (3d) 1259 at 
1267 (11th Cir 2010); United States v Buford, 632 F (3d) 264 at 276-7 (6th Cir 2011). 
180 HPrring, supra note 164 at 708 (Ginsburg, dissenting). 
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is, is actually its 'fruit.' And it is here that the famous exception of 'atte-
nuated taint' and its closely related subcategories 'inevitable discovery' or 
'independent source' are invoked to admit arguably derivative evidence. 
Each of these exceptions has been recognized and applied by the 
Spanish courts, despite Spain's categorical exclusionary rule in relation 
to derivative evidence. 181 Since the aforementioned Constitutional Court 
decision in 1998, Spain's courts now engage in a balancing test to deter-
mine whether to exclude the fruits of a constitutional violation and the 
test is framed in terms of a limitation on the doctrine of the 'fruits of 
the poisonous tree.' An exception to the otherwise categorical nde can 
exist 'even when there is a factual causal nexus between the illegality 
and the evidence, if the causal link is not based in the illegality' (is not 
'antijuridical'). In assessing the existence of a legally relevant connec-
tion, the following elements should be taken into account: (a) what the 
significance was of the constitutional infringement; (b) what importance 
the evidence had for proving guilt; (c) whether there was a hypothetical 
clean path to discover the evidence (i.e., inevitable discovery); (d) 
whether the right violated requires special protection; and (e) whether 
the violating officers acted intentionally or erred in good faith and thus 
whether exclusion is necessary for deterrent purposes. 182 
I will now discuss how courts approach the issue of 'fruits' in deciding 
whether to suppress fruit-; of both privacy violations and unconstitutional 
confessions. 
b Fruits of illegal dwelling searches 
( 1) Independent source and inevitable discovery 
The courts will generally allow evidence that has been discovered through 
an illegal 'search' if it is actually 'seized' by independent legal means. 183 
The courts will also admit evidence which is seized illegally if it would 
inevitably have been discovered through legal means. 184 The doctrine of 
181 See the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court in STS (5June 1995) RJ No 4538,6058 
at 6060; for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 118-9. 
182 STS 9/2004 (19 January 2004), online: <http://sentenciasjuridicas.com/index. 
php >. 
183 The doctrine of 'independent source' is applied in cases where there have been two 
searches, an illegal one and a legal one, independent of the illegality. It is applied, 
for instance, when police discover the presence of evidence illegally but actually 
seize it pursuant to a search warrant based on information they possessed before the 
illegal search; see Seg:ura v United States, 468 US 796 at 805 (1984); Murray, supra note 
25 at 537. 
184 This doctrine of 'inevitable discovery' is applied where there is only one search and 
seizure but other investigative procedures independent of the illegality would have 
discovered the evidence legally. Williams, supra note 24 at 444. The Germans call this 
the 'hypothetical independent source' or 'hypothetical clean path'; Weigend, supra 
note 91 at 253. 
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'inevitable discovery,' however, can serve as a gaping loophole in consti-
tutional protections if interpreted in too broad a manner. Some 
American courts have recognized this exception if the police, who had 
probable cause, were already in the process of getting a search warrant 
when they erroneously but in good faith felt that exigent circumstances 
existed which allowed them to make a warrantless entry. 185 However, the 
most dangerous extension of this notion of a 'hypothetical independent 
source' is when the court allows the introduction of evidence because 
probable cause existed and a judge would have approved a warrant appli-
cation had it been submitted.186 The German Courts have routinely used 
this latter rationale and almost never exclude the direct fruits of warrant-
less searches.'"' 
(2) The seizure is not a fruit of the unlawful search 
In overseas jurisprudence one finds doctrines which sever the causal con-
nection between a constitutional illegality and its 'fruits' in ways unknown 
in the United States. One of these is the notion that seizures are concep-
tually independent of searches and that if the seizure is 'legal' then the 
nexus of illegality hao; been attenuated. Another is that a seizure that is 
a causal result of an illegal search can, nevertheless, be attenuated by judi-
cial balancing of other factors. 
It is a doctrine firmly entrenched in Italy and accepted by courts in 
Germany that the seizure of drugs, for instance, is not the fruit of a 
clearly unconstitutional search, even where the express object of the 
search was to find those self-same drugs. The Italian courts reason that, 
since CPP-Italy section 253(1) requires the police to seize the corpus 
delicti of a crime (that is, fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband), 
then this legal seizure cannot be vitiated by an antecedent unconstitu-
tional search, be it without probable cause or judicial authorization.'"" 
The courts have held that searches and seizures have different juridical 
185 United States v Cabassa, 62 F (3d) 470 at 473 (2d Cir 1995); United States v Whitehorn, 829 
F (2d) 1225 at 1232-3 (2d Cir 1987), with respect to a search warrant signed after the 
search; United States v Curtis, 931 F (2d) 1011 at 1013 (4th Cir 1991). 
186 The overwhelming majority of US courts have rejected this argument, for it would 
make the warrant requirement meaningless. United States v johnson, 22 F (3d) 674 at 
680 (6th Cir 1994); United States v Echegoyen, 799 F (2d) 1271 at 1279 (9th Cir 1986); 
State v Handtmann, 437 NW 2d 830 at 838 (ND 1989); United States v Brawn, 64 F 
(3d) 1083 at 1085 (7th Cir 1995). 
187 See Ransiek, supra note 95 at 566. In 1989, the German Supreme Court held that the 
evidence found in an unconstitutional search will be admissible as long as it is 
otherwise legally seizable (i.e., is contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime) 
and a judge would have issued a search warrant had the police sought one; see 
Weigend, supra note 91 at 252. 
188 Italian Supreme Court (27 March 1996) Giust Penale 138, 140, 144-5 (1997); for 
English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 122-4. 
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presuppositions and functions and cannot be viewed as linked due to 
their convergence in reality. 189 As was noted in Section III above, the doc-
trine of 'fruits of the poisonous tree' applies only to 'nullities' when 
expressly provided by statute and not to the general exclusionary rule 
in CCP-Italy section 191.'"0 This doctrine is baffling, because the Italian 
literature, like the Spanish, asserts that 'nullities' relate only to non-
constitutional violations in the gathering of evidence, whereas 'non-
usability' applies only to violations of fundamental rights. 191 
By separating an unlawful search, which is a tool to find evidence to 
use in a criminal case, from its object, the evidence sought, the Italian 
and German courts ignore the plain meaning of their constitutional 
prohibitions on unwarranted searches in order to achieve a goal, the 
conviction of a guilty person at any cost, which is no longer the purported 
goal of criminal procedure. It is clear that the prohibition .of the 
violation of privacy of the dwelling is not only rooted in the protection 
of privacy, but also constitutes a limitation on the ability of the state to 
gather information or seize evidence in those spaces. Search and 
seizure cannot be logically separated into different actions with different 
motivations. 192 
c Fruits of unconstitutional interceptions of confidential conversations 
Unlike in America, where the fruits of a violation of the wiretap statute 
are explicitly inadmissible, the approach in Europe is less rigorous. In 
Germany, for instance, the testimony of witnesses who were discovered 
through an illegal interception has been admitted at trial.'"' Although 
CCP-Italy section 271 ( 1) mandates 'non-usability' of illegally intercepted 
conversations, CCP-Italy section 271 (3) makes an exception for physical 
fruits which can prove cmpus delicti. There is also no restriction on 
using the contents of 'non-usable' conversations to further the investi-
gation, discover new crimes, and so on.'94 New wiretaps may also be 
based on the information gained from antecedent illegal ones.'"' 
189 Italian Supreme Court (24 April1991) Decision No; cited in Conso & Grevi, supra note 
43 at 550. 
190 See Decision No 332/2001, supra note 43; cj Conso & Grevi, supra note 43 at 339. 
191 Giuseppe Luigi Fanuli, Inutilizzabilita e nullita della pwva nel giudizio ablmroiato, net 
'jJatteggiamento' e nell'istituto della acquisizione degli atti su accordo delle parti (Milan: 
Giuffre, 2004) at 5-6. 
192 Ransiek, supra note 95 at 568. At least one section of the Italian Supreme Court has 
rejected the prevailing doctrine and recognizes a strict functional relationship 
between the act of searching and the seizure. Italian Supreme Court (13 March 
1992) Decision No; cited in Conso & Grevi, supra note 43 at 550. 
193 See Weigend, supra nole 91 al 253. 
194 Franco Cordero, Procedura penale, 5th ed (Milan: Giuffre, 2000) at 804. 
195 Conso & Grevi, supra note 43 at 399. 
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Until the advent of the new approach of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court in 1998,196 physical evidence found as a result of an unconstitu-
tional wiretap or bugging was routinely suppressed in accordance with 
LOPJ-Spain section 11.1 and could not be used at trial. 197 For example, 
in one case police used a scanner to intercept cell-phone conversations 
without having obtained judicial authorization. The information gath-
ered led to an arrest and the search incident thereto uncovered drugs. 
The Supreme Court held that the drugs were fruit of the poisonous 
tree and could not be used. 19s Since the advent of the new case law, 
however, the decision has depended on the new balancing test men-
tioned above. 199 In the seminal 1998 case, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court used the doctrine of inevitable discovery to dissociate the arrest 
of the defendant in possession of drugs from an unconstitutional 
wiretap by arguing that the defendant had already been under heavy 
police surveillance and the arrest was therefore not sufficiently tainted 
by the antecedent illegality.""" 
d 'Fruits' of 'involuntary' confessions which may or may not be the 
product of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
I submit, based on the analysis in Part III-A above, that any fruits, even 
physical evidence, of confessions induced by torture or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment must be suppressed, provided that the taint has 
not been attenuated. The USSC has also indicated that the 'fruits of 
the poisonous tree' of 'involuntary' confessions which were not 
induced by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment would also not be 
usable in a criminal trial. Thus, in Oregon v Elstad201 the Court held that 
a voluntary confession following proper section 11.1 warnings202 would 
be subject to exclusion if it followed on the heels of a confession 
deemed to be involuntary under the due process analysis. In Patane,2"' a 
plurality of the Court also said that physical evidence would be subject 
to exclusion if found as a result of a 'coerced' confession. Because the 
USSC based its reluctance to apply the 'fruits of the poisonous tree' doc-
trine to Miranda violations on their supposed sub-constitutional, 
196 STC 81/1998, supra note 171. 
197 See Juan-Luis Gomez Colomer, 'La intervenci6n judicial de las comunicaciones 
telef6nicas a Ia luz de lajurispmdencia' (1998) 97 Revistajuridica de Catalunya 145 
at 162-6. 
198 STS 137/1999 (8 Febmary 1999), online: <http://sentenciasJuridicas.com/index. 
php >. 
199 See text accompanying note 173 supra. 
200 Sec STC 81/1998, supra note 171. 
201 470 US 298 at 340 (1985). 
202 On section 11.1 warnings, see Miranda, supra note 22. 
203 Supr<t note 64 at 632. 
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'prophylactic' character, it would follow, therefore, that a clear consti-
tutional violation of due process resulting in an involuntary confession 
would necessarily require exclusion of the 'fruits,' whether they be in 
the form of subsequent confessions or physical evidence.204 In addition, 
no evidence derived in any way from a statement compelled through a 
grant of immunity may be admissible in a trial of the person who was 
granted immunity.205 
In some jurisdictions, however, the fruits of involuntary statements may 
be used. Although PACE section 76(2) (a) provides that a confession 
'may' be rendered inadmissible 'where it is the product of "oppres-
sion,"'206 section 76( 4-6) of the same statute allows for the admission 
in evidence of any facts or physical evidence which were found as a 
result of the inadmissible confession.207 Argentine courts have also 
allowed the use of information from involuntary confessions to further 
the investigation. 208 
e Fruits of 'unknowing' confessions taken in violation of the right to 
counsel or without admonitions as to the right to silence 
Following the Patanedecision,209 there is no bar in the US federal courts to 
using physical evidence gathered as a result of a violation of the Miranda 
rule. Many European countries take a similar approach. For instance, the 
Italian courts do not recognize the doctrine of 'fruits of the poisonous 
tree' for physical evidence or witnesses discovered through otherwise 
unlawful confessions.210 In Germany, which has given Miranda warnings 
constitutional status, the courts do not extend the evidentiary prohibition 
to the 'fruits' of a confession taken without the proper warnings, whether 
in the form of physical evidence or subsequent confessions.211 
204 Supporting this iiHerpretation, LaFave et al, supra note 53 at 543. 
205 18 USC § 6002: 'The prosecution has a burden to prove the evidence it uses is derived 
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.' See also 
Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441 at 460 (1972). 
206 PACE, supra note 120. 
207 Ibid. Compare ibid at para 76(5), which provides, nevertheless, that the jury shall not 
be told that the 'facts' were derived from the statements of the defendant. Duff, supra 
note 149 at 152, alleges that there are no English cases upholding the suppression of 
physical evidence. 
208 Alejandro D Carri6 & Alejandro M Garro, 'Argentina' in Craig M Bradley, ed, Criminal 
Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007) 3 at 
32-3. 
209 Supra note 64. 
210 Elizabeth MT Di Palma, 'Riflessioni sulla sfera di operativita della sanzione di cui 
all'art. 191 cpp' in Vincenzo Perchinunno, ed, Percorsi di Procedura Penale. Dal 
garantismo inquisitorio a un accusatorio non garantito (Milan: Giuffre, 1996) at 113 at 115. 
211 Weigend, supra note 91 at 261. 
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Some US state courts, however, have suppressed physical evidence 
resulting from a Miranda violation, whether or not the violation was inten-
tional or inadvertent. 212 
In Canada, police are not constitutionally required to advise detained 
suspects of the right to silence before questioning them, but section 
lO(b) of the Charter does accord arrested persons the right to attempt 
to contact counsel before being interrogated.213 If the right to counsel 
has been violated, however, and derivative evidence is found that could 
not have been found but for the violation, the Canadian courts consider 
this to be 'conscript.ed' evidence and have traditionally suppressed it. 
Thus, if a suspect points out incriminating evidence in his own house, 
which would have been searched anyway, this would be admissible; but 
if the accused, while being denied the right to counsel, informs police 
that the murder weapon is at the bottom of a frozen river, this must be 
suppressed.214 Whether the 'conscription' doctrine is still viable is ques-
tionable, since the Canadian Supreme Court recently adopted a new 
approach to exclusion in two 2009 cases.215 
F BALANCING THE QUALITY OR IMPORTANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
i Introduction: Distinguishing among different kinds of evidence 
Prior to 2002, in New Zealand there was a rebuttable presumption that 
illegally gathered evidence was inadmissible. The New Zealand Court of 
Appeal, however, adopted a new, multi-factor 'fairness' test in 2002 
which gives the trial judge broad discretion in deciding whether to 
exclude illegally gathered evidence and provides a list of criteria to be 
weighed, including the 'seriousness of the offense' and the 'importance 
of the evidence.'"'" A similar test was adopted by the Australian High 
Court, which required trial courts to consider the question of whether 
there was bad faith on the part of the police, the importance of the evi-
dence, ~he seriousness of the offence, and the ease with which the law 
might have been complied with."' 7 
212 Commonwealth v Martin, 827 NE (2d) 198 at 215 (Mass 2005); State v Knapp, 700 NW 
(2d) 899 at 905-6 (Wis 2005); State v Peterson, 923 A (2d) 585 at 588-91 (Vt 2007); 
State v Vondehn, 236 P (3d) 691 at 695 (Or 2010). 
213 Roach, supra note 156 at 75-7. 
214 Ibid at 71. 
215 See Grant, supra note 157 at para 16, where the court balanced a non-egregious 
unlawful detention and questioning by virtue of which the defendant was 
'conscripted' to admit possession of a gun against the importance of the rights 
impinged on thereby and the importance of the physical evidence to determine the 
tmth of the charges and admitted the gun. 
216 R v Shaheed, [2002) 2 NZLR 377 (CA); cited in Mahoney, supra note 151 at 607. 
217 Bunning, supra note 168 at 380. 
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The right to privacy in Germany and some other countries is 
grounded in the right to human dignity and most importantly the 
'right to develop one's personality.' 218 This approach has led to declaring 
certain items non-seizable, even where the government has probable 
cause that they would be material to prove guilt in a criminal case. In 
Germany, for instance, this protection extends to personal diaries219 and 
to a person's spoken words when surreptitiously recorded by another, 
whether the recorder is or is not a state official. 220 
This doctrine is reminiscent of the old 'mere evidence' doctrine of the 
USSC which was overruled in 1967.221 According to that doctrine, the gov-
ernment only had a right to seize the corp1!S delicti of crime; that is, objects 
to which it had a superior title, such as fruits and instruments of crime, 
and contraband. Personal papers were protected unless they were instru-
ments of crime.222 In fact, to search for and seize a person's words, even 
where put to paper or uttered under no compulsion, was considered to 
be tantamount to compelling self-incrimination. As the Boyd court 
noted, '[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's 
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substan-
tially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. '223 
The now overruled 'mere evidence' rule and the current German 
limitations on using highly personal evidence to prove guilt are examples, 
not merely of prohibitions on 'use' due to the irregular or illegal methods 
of seizure/24 but of prima facie intrinsic prohibitions on the seizure of what 
may be highly probative evidence. 
ii F:vidence of questionable reliability 
Coerced or otherwise involuntary confessions were traditionally excluded 
in the United States due to their lack of credibility rather than on consti-
tutional grounds.225 Today, even potentially probative evidence may be 
218 Consl-Germany, sup1a note 92, art 2(1) 
219 See Decision of German Supreme Court of 21 February 1964, 19 BGHSt 325 at 326-8 
(1964); for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 82. 
220 See Decision of German Supreme Court of 14June 1960, 14 BGHSt 358 at 359-60, 
364-5 (1960); for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 
at 72-3. 
221 Warden, supra note 100 at 309-10. 
222 Bayd v United States, 116 US 616 at 628 (1886); rn;eks, supra note 14 at 391-2. 
223 Bayd, ibid at 633. Note the similarity with the now out-dated Canadian exclusionary rule 
based on constitutional violations which 'conscript' the defendant to give evidence 
against himself. For a similar comparison of a subpoena duces tecum with an 
involuntary confession, see Beling, supra note 28 at 14. 
224 On the distinction between Beweiserhebungsverbot (evidentiary gathering prohibition) 
and Beweisverwertungsverbot (evidentiary use prohibition), see ClatL~ Roxin, 
Strafuerfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch, 24th ed (Munich: Beck, 1995) at 164. 
225 Hopt v Territory of Utah, 110 US 574 at 585 (1884). 
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excluded if the judge decides that its prejudicial nature outweighs it<> pro-
bative value.22" 
A number of post-Soviet codes have exclusionary rules which limit 
exclusion to situations where the violation 'influenced or could have 
influenced the credibility of the evidence. ' 227 Such emphasis on the credi-
bility of the evidence also constitutes one prong of the tests which have 
been adopted by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and for the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Rule 95 of the IC1Y Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence provides: 'No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by 
methods which cast substantial doubt on it<> reliability or if its admission 
is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the pro-
ceedings.'228 Identical language was incorporated into section 69(7) of 
the Rnme Statute for the International Criminal Court!29 
Exclusionary rules based on the questionable reliability of evidence 
are unremarkable, for courts should generally only admit reliable and rel-
evant evidence or, at the least, should prevent judges from relying on 
questionable evidence when formulating the reasons for their decisions. 
iii Physical evidence that proves corpus delicti 
We have discussed how, in Italy the police duty to seize contraband, fruits, 
and instrumentalities of crime - that is, the corpus delicti - breaks the 
nexus between a patently unconstitutional search and its intended 
fruits and allows the use of the evidence collected!'" The other side of 
this equation is that 'mere evidence' discovered in a patently illegal 
search would be 'non-usable,' much as it was under Boyd even following 
a warranted search based on probable cause. 
The unwillingness of most courts to suppress physical evidence which 
is a fruit of a violation of the right to privacy or the Miranda rules and of 
some to do so when the evidence is the fruit of an unconstitutional 
wiretap or an involuntary confession speaks to the preponderance of 
truth-finding over constitutional rights, at least when dealing with the 
226 Fed R Evid 403; Cal Evidence Code § 352. 
227 CCP-Armenia at para 105 (footnote info needed on three of these). Similar language is 
used in CCP-Azerbaijan § 125(2) (l); CCP-Moldova § 94(2); and CCP-Turkmenistan § 
125. 
228 UN, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc IT/32/Rev 40 
(2007). See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, adopted 5 July 1996, online: <http://wWw.unictr.org/Portals/O/ 
English %5CLegal%5CEvidance%5CEnglish %5C050796e.pdf > . 
229 The Rome Statute of the lnlemaiional Criminal Court, UNGAOR, 53d Sess, UN Doc A/ 
CONF183/9 (1998). 
230 See text accompanying note 188 supra. 
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most reliable of evidence. This balancing is justified by some courts with 
the assertion that the admission of physical evidence can never violate the 
right to a fair trial because it is not really the 'fruit' of the violation, nor 
dependent thereon, having pre-existed the violation.231 
G THE GRAVITY OF THE CRIME WHICH IS BEING PROSECUTED 
Beling's treatise on evidentiary prohibitions clearly provided for more 
liberal admissibility of illegally seized evidence in capital cases than in 
less serious ones: '[T] he interest in solving high treason or a murder is 
infinitely greater than the interest in investigating and punishing a 
cyclist who drives on the wrong side of the road, or a sassy young man 
who gives his desire for singing too long a rein during night time 
hours.' 232 Beling's approach has now been squarely adopted by the 
German courts. Thus, even if a court is dealing with a grave violation 
of the right to develop one's personality which would normally lead to 
exclusion of a diary, for instance, the court must still weigh the serious-
ness of the crime charged before deciding whether to exclude. 233 
Andrew Ashworth has, in my view correctly, asserted that the serious-
ness of the charges facing the defendant should never go into the balan-
cing process because the more serious the charge, the more detrimental 
will be the introduction of the evidence to the defendant due to the more 
severe punishment awaiting him.2" A compromise position here would be 
to mandate a reduction of punishment if the state violated the consti-
tution in order to bring someone to justice.235 
In another context, I have suggested that all interrogations should take 
place only after counsel has been provided and that confessions should 
be negotiated, much like plea-bargains: the defendant could agree to 
help the state in proving guilt but only after having negotiated a dis-
counted punishment. The truth might better be ascertained through a 
grant of leniency than through the typical psychological coercion of cus-
todial interrogation.236 Criminal codes could also provide statutory 
231 This rationalization is employed in South Mrica; sec Schwikkard & van der Merwe, 
supra note 155 at 488. 
232 Beling, supra note 28 at 35. 
233 The German Supreme Court allowed use of a dia1y in a brutal rape-murder case but 
not in a peijury case; Thaman, Criminall'rocedure, supra note 37 at 113. 
234 Ashworth, supra note 148 at 732 [cited in Duff]; discussed in Duff, supra note 149 at 
169-71. 
235 This is allowed under CCP-Netherlands, supra note 44, § 359a and is suggested by some 
US commentators; see Guido Calabresi, 'The Exclusionary Rule' (2003) 26 Harv JL & 
Pub Pol 'y 111 at 116. 
236 Stephen C Thaman, 'Gerechtigkeit und Verfahrensvielfalt: Logik der beschleunigten, 
konsuellen und vereinfachten Strafprozessmodelle' in Stefan Machura & Stefan 
lJJbrich, eds, Recht-GeJellschafl-Kornmunikation: Festschrift fur Klaus F !Whl (Baden 
Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2003) 314. 
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mitigation whenever -the use of unconstitutionally acquired evidence is 
required to prove guilt. In other words, the maximum punishment 
should only be allowable if the state can prove guilt without any help 
from the defendant, whether obtained voluntarily or involuntarily. 
H APPROPRIATE BALANCING 
The balancing doctrines discussed in this part of the paper are applied to 
illegal evidence gathering of all kinds. As argued above, they should not 
be applied where the illegality in question involves a violation of funda-
mental constitutional rights. Nonetheless, these doctrines are useful in 
considering appropriate balancing in cases where an illegality of lesser 
significance has occurred. In such cases, factors relevant to the serious-
ness of the violation (e.g., good or bad faith) can be balanced against 
factors relevant to the effect of the evidence on the· trial (e.g., trial fair-
ness, reliability). However, for the reasons given by Ashworth, the serious-
ness of the offence should not be a factor. 
VI Conclus~on 
Only a few jurisdictions, notably those which have recently emerged from 
under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes (former Soviet and Yugoslav 
republics, Turkey, Latin American countries) have foreclosed all balan-
cing in relation to the use of any evidence which was gathered illegally, 
whether or not the illegality was of constitutional proportions. 
Otherwise, the international community has clearly prohibited any balan-
cing in relation to statements obtained through torture, or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment and appears to be moving in that 
direction in relation to statements given either involuntarily or in the 
absence of counsel. Although most countries will suppress confidential 
communications that were obtained in violation of wiretap legislation, a 
blanket exclusionary rule which includes fruits, such as exists in the US 
legislation, is not yet a commonplace in relation to either illegal wiretaps 
or involuntary or counsel-less statements. 
Once a country advances from a police state to an entrenched demo-
cratic society, should we allow more balancing (i.e., tolerate more police 
lawlessness) or less? Should we extend categorical exclusion, including 
that of 'fruits,' to privacy and Mimnda violations or even admit of balan-
cing in relation to what are considered to be more serious violations? The 
categorical exclusionary rule of LOPJ-5pain section 11.1 was arguably still 
a reaction to the abuses of the Francoist police but has now given way to a 
balancing test. In the United States, the harsh language of lteeks con-
demning widespread police violation of rights led to seemingly categori-
cal exclusionary rules in Mapp and Mimnda, but the recent cases, which 
propose doing more balancing, seem to intimate that our police have 
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now developed to such an extent that the old toughness is no longer 
required.237 But if police have become more professional, shouldn't 
they be aware of constitutional rules and follow them? Or do our 
modern constitutional rules prevent police from solving crimes or 
make it too time consuming? 
Once such a violation of constitutional importance has been ascer-
tained, there should be a presumption that any evidence directly or 
indirectly gathered as a result of the violation should be excluded. 
Valid exceptions, such as for good faith mistakes or emergency situations, 
should be narrowly construed in the way I have argued above. 'Fruits of 
the poisonous tree,' even physical evidence, should be excluded when 
the taint of the violation has not been attenuated, there is no true inde-
pendent source, and the evidence would not inevitably have been 
discovered. 
The seriousness of the crime under investigation should play a role in 
the assessment of whether emergency or exigent circumstances will 
obviate the necessity to secure a warrant or administer Miranda warnings 
but should not be an omnibus reason to admit evidence where there has 
been a clear and unforgiveable constitutional violation. The area of 'good 
faith' of the violating official should be limited to cases where the officer 
was using what were formerly accepted practices at the time of the inves-
tigative measure that were subsequently deemed to violate constitutional 
principles, or where a search warrant was obtained based on evidence 
which was close to being 'probable cause.' A police officer who acts neg-
ligently is not acting in 'good faith,' especially in a case like Herring, where 
police were negligent in looking for a pretext to arrest someone as to 
whom they had no reasonable suspicion.238 
Finally, the importance of the evidence to convict the defendant 
should never be a factor. The ECtHR has consistently ruled that the 
use of evidence gathered in violation of the defendant's right to confront 
her accusers, which is protected by ECHR article 6 (e) (d), will violate the 
'fair trial' right of ECHR article 6 if it is the main evidence of guilt but not 
necessarily if it is only used to corroborate other substantial evidence of 
guilt.239 The ECtHR has taken this approach in relation to the violation 
of the right to counsel in Salduz and I believe they should extend it to vio-
lations of the right to privacy as well. 
The area where true judicial balancing should have free rein, is where. 
the violation is truly not of constitutional significance, such as errors in 
237 See for instance Hudson, supra note 33 at 598-9. 
238 Herring, supra note 164 at 698, noting that the reason for stopping the defendant was 
that he Wds 'no stranger to law enforcement.' 
239 See discussion of ECtHR case law in Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 
129-35. 
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the execution of a search or wiretap warrant otherwise based on probable 
cause. Here, the seriousness of the violation can be weighed against the 
seriousness of the offence, the intentionality of the violations, and so on. 
When balancing is allowed, it should also not be undertaken by the 
trial judge, especially in those systems based in the civil law, where the 
trial judge is considered to be an investigator of the material truth of 
the charges. A judge with such inquisitorial duties will intentionally or 
instinctively give priority to the principle of material truth in exercising 
the Herculean balancing act and neglect the equally important role as 
constitutional guarantor. Therefore, if judicial balancing is to persist, it 
should be carried out by a neutral judge of the investigation, or liberty 
judge, and not the trial judge or investigating magistrate, who is also 
duty-bound to seek truth. 
